In Re Bruns

TURRENTINE, J.,

pro tem.

It. appears that petitioner herein having been duly subpoenaed, did on the 16th day of December, 1935, appear as a witness before the grand jury of San Diego County for the year 1935, then in session at the San Diego County courthouse in the city, township, and county of San Diego, and which was then engaged in an investigation to determine whether one Edgar Dudley had feloniously conspired with others to bribe a public official to wit, the district attorney of San Diego County. The petitioner having been first lawfully sworn to testify and it being material to this inquiry to learn what funds of money Dudley had at his command and who furnished money to him for the alleged purpose of bribing the district attorney of San Diego County, petitioner was interrogated by the deputy district attorney advising said grand jury and made reply to said questions as follows: “Q. What is your name? A. Paul Bruns. Q. What is your profession? A. Attorney. Q. State whether or not you are the attorney for Edgar Dudley. A. I am. Q. State whether or not you gave Mr. LaBlanc $100 to deliver to Mr. Dudley some time ago. A. I refuse to answer. Q. On what ground ? A. On the ground of professional privilege. Q. You know the law as well as I do, that where one person has come in and given you a message to give to a third person, that is not privileged. I will present the law to you if you want me to get it. I think you know it as well as I do—that the only communication that is privileged between attorney and client is when the client speaks to him privately as his attorney. That when the client, no matter who he may be, gives you a message to give to a third person, no matter who it may be, that conversation is not privileged. And certainly the act of delivery of

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money is not a privileged communication. Now, I will put the question to you again; did you deliver $100 to this Mr. LaBlanc to give to Mr. Dudley ? A. I refuse to answer. Q. On what ground ? A. On the ground of professional privilege. Q. Are you the attorney of Mr. LaBlanc? A. I refuse to answer. Q. Have you talked to Mr. LaBlanc? A. I have. Q. What was the gist of your conversation? A. I refuse to answer. Q. On what ground, now? A. Professional privilege. Q. Now, let’s get this clear, so that we can go before the Superior Court and will know where we stand. Do you state to this Grand Jury that you are his attorney ? A. Well, I refuse to answer that question, also on the same ground. Q. Did you receive any money from any persons during this past year to give to Dudley? A. I refuse to answer on the ground of professional privilege. Q. Do you state that the individuals who gave you any money, if they did, were your clients ? A. I refuse to answer, on the same ground. Q. Did you receive that money from individuals in San Diego? A. I refuse to answer, on the same ground. Q. Did you receive that money from an individual in Los Angeles? A. I refuse to answer, on the same ground. Q. Were you employed by any association or individuals to give Dudley money to carry on certain activities in San Diego ? A. I refuse to answer, on the same ground. Q. You refuse to tell us whether or not you were attorney for these individuals; is that correct—those who gave you money? A. I don’t think I heard the last part of the question. Q. You refuse to tell us whether or not the individuals who gave you the money are your clients? A. Yes, I do. Q. Did you receive some money from Mr. C. 0. Richards of this city? A. I refuse to answer on the ground of professional privilege. Q. Are you the attorney of Mr. Richards, or were you at any time? A. I refuse to answer that question, on the ground of professional privilege.”