Kaiser v. Hopkins

THE COURT.

We granted a hearing in this case after decision by the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Two, because the decision of the appellate court was in conflict with the decision of another appellate district in

Dooley

v.

Johnson,

133 Cal. App. 459 [24 Pac. (2d) 540]. In said case a petition for hearing in this court was not filed. After careful consideration we are of the view that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal in the instant case, written by Mr. Justice Wood, contains a correct statement of the law, and we therefore adopt said opinion as our decision. It follows:

“Plaintiff petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel the defendant, assessor of Los Angeles county, to grant him exemption from taxation in accordance with the provisions of the state Constitution, wherein it is declared that ‘the property to the amount of $1,000 of every resident of this state who has served in the army, navy, marine corps or revenue marine service of the United States in time of war and received an honorable discharge therefrom . . . shall be exempt from taxation’. (Art. XIII, see. 1%-) Plaintiff served in the United States army from May 13, 1919, to May 12, 1922. Defendant appeals from a judgment in plaintiff’s favor. The sole question for determination in the proceeding is whether a soldier who enlisted and served after the armistice of November 11, 1918, is entitled to the exemption provided for those who served ‘in time of war ’.

“ It is á general rule of statutory construction that the courts will interpret a measure adopted by vote of the people in such manner as to give effect to the intent of the voters adopting it. (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, [5th ed.], see. 66.) It must be held that the voters judged of the amendment they were adopting by the meaning apparent on its face according to the general use of the words employed. Such is the rule where it does not appear that the words were used in a technical sense.

(Miller

v.

Dunn,

72 Cal. 462 [14 Pac. 27, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67].) ‘Where a word having a technical as well as a popular meaning is used in the Constitution, the courts will accord to it its popular signification, unless the very nature of the subject indicates,