Columbia - Geneva Steel Division v. Industrial Accident Commission
Before: Dooling
DOOLING, J.
In this proceeding before the Industrial Accident Commission the referee who originally heard the application made findings against the applicant and an award was made accordingly denying him any relief. Panel One of the commission thereafter granted the applicant's petition for reconsideration and without further hearing made an award of compensation to the applicant. The evidence was in sharp conflict as to whether applicant was suffering from an injury arising out of his employment. The applicant testified that on March 24, 1951, while he was shoving a ten-ton “back-up roll” suspended on a crane he felt a sharp pain in his heel. He is suffering from a ruptured inter-vertebral disc which, according to his medical reports, probably resulted from the strain at the time that he felt the pain in his heel. The employer produced reports showing that applicant was not working on March 24 and that on that date no “back-up rolls” were being handled in the shop where applicant worked. These records showed that applicant did work on March 23 and that “back-up rolls” were handled in the shop on that date. There was also testimony that applicant originally claimed that his injury occurred on March 21 and it is undisputed that there was a delay in his notifying his employer that he claimed to be suffering from an industrial injury. Relying on the amendment to section 5952, Labor Code, adding to the grounds of review that “ (d) The order, decision or award was not supported by substantial evidence” (Stats. 1951, ch. 606) petitioner argues that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding of the panel that applicant sustained injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.
This amendment was not intended to give the courts the power to substitute their judgment for that of the commission as to the effect or weight of the evidence. Section 9 of the statute embodying this amendment specifically provides that it does not “permit the court to hold a trial de novo,
[864]
to take evidence, or to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.” (Stats. 1951, p. 1769.) Since we cannot exercise our independent judgment on the evidence our inquiry ends when we find substantial evidence to support the panel’s finding. The evidence of the applicant above outlined meets this test and the effect of the contradictory evidence and matters tending to discredit applicant’s testimony were for the panel to weigh and determine.
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)