In Re Griffin

California Supreme Court Dec 23, 1965 No. Crim. 8752Published

Before: Peters

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. An amendatory statute that increases the punishment for a crime, when considered as a whole, cannot be applied to a defendant whose offense was committed prior to the amendment's enactment without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Issues

Whether an amendatory statute that decreases the minimum prison term but increases the minimum parole eligibility period constitutes an increase in punishment.
Whether an amendatory statute that increases the punishment for a crime can be applied to a defendant whose conviction was not final at the time of the amendment.

Disposition. denied

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Since the amendment, considered as a whole, increased the penalty it cannot be applied to petitioner without violating the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation.”

“Whatever the technical nature of a parole may be, from a realistic point of view it is our opinion that such a statute increases the punishment rather than decreases it.”

“As applied to petitioner, we hold that when considered realistically and as a whole, the amendatory statute increased the punishment, and so cannot be made applicable to petitioner.”

PETERS, J.

In this petition for habeas corpus,

[758]

petitioner seeks to raise the same problem involved in

In re Estrada, ante,

page 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948], this day decided. That problem is, where, prior to finality of a judgment of conviction, the statute under which petitioner was charged and convicted is amended so as to decrease the punishment, is the petitioner entitled to the benefits of the amendatory statute?

Estrada, supra,

holds that he is. If that were the only point involved in the instant case,

Estrada, supra,

would be controlling. But it is not the only point involved. Here, the amendatory statute only in a limited sense ameliorated the punishment. In a very real and practical sense it increased the penalty. Since the amendment, considered as a whole, increased the penalty it cannot be applied to petitioner without violating the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.)

The facts are not in dispute. Defendant was charged and convicted on three counts of sales of marijuana in violation of section 11531 of the Health and Safety Code. He was also charged and convicted of a prior felony conviction under the same section.

On May 2, 1961, he was sentenced to 10 years to life. That was q, proper sentence under the section as it then read.

On appeal, the District Court of Appeal afSrmed the conviction on the three counts of sale, but ordered the judgment modified as to the prior by determining that such prior was a misdemeanor and not a felony.

(People

Griffin,

209 Cal. App.2d 557 [26 Cal.Rptr. 311].) This decision was rendered November 15, 1962. The trial court, pursuant to this decision, corrected the judgment to show that the prior was a misdemeanor, but made no change in the sentence of 10 years to life, because as the statute read when the act was committed, the conviction under section 11531 plus the conviction of a prior of “any offense’’ constituting a violation of that division of the code required the 10-year to life sentence. The words “any offense” obviously included either a prior misdemeanor or a prior felony of the type described.

In Re Griffin

AI Brief

PETERS, J.

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief