In Re Robinson

DOOLING, J.

Petitioner was found guilty of the crime of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3) and applied for probation. On April 24, 1953, the court imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail, suspended the execution of the sentence and granted petitioner probation for a term of three years. On May 14, 1954, after proceedings regularly taken, the court revoked petitioner’s probation and sentenced him to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. Petitioner is now confined in the state prison at San Quentin pursuant to this judgment.

Where a judgment authorized by law has been pronounced and its execution suspended before granting probation Penal Code, section 1203.2, provides that upon revocation of probation “the judgment shall be in full force and effect” and it has been held that the court under such circumstances has no power to impose a different judgment on revoking probation.

(In re Loros,

48 Cal.App.2d 680 [120 P.2d 69].)

In this case, however, the judgment first imposed by the court, imprisonment in the county jail for one year was one which the statute (Pen. Code, § 264) gave the court no power to impose, since the only punishment provided therein for forcible rape is imprisonment in the state prison. for not more than 50 years. The People therefore argue, and we believe correctly, that the court had the power to impose the only legally proper sentence.on petitioner upon the revocation of his probation.

Petitioner argues that the original sentence,. though erroneous, was not void and that the time for appeal therefrom having expired such judgment was final when the court imposed the second judgment and was beyond the power of the court to correct. Petitioner cites

In re Reed,

143 Cal. 634 [77 P. 660, 101 Am.St.Rep. 138], in which case the sen

[486]

tence had been for seven years where the minimum sentence provided by law was ten. The court held in that case that the judgment though erroneous was not void, saying (p. 635): “The judgment does not impose any kind of punishment different from that prescribed by the code. ... If the judgment had been for ten years, it would have been a judgment for seven years and three year's more, and, so far as the mere naked question of jurisdiction is involved, the power to sentence for the longer term includes the power to sentence for the shorter.”