People v. Anderson

Opinion

RICHARDSON, J.

Defendants James Anderson and Dennis Davis have appealed from convictions of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192), with findings that each defendant was armed with a deadly weapon

(id,

§ 12022). Among other contentions, defendants assert that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence that, on two prior occasions, they had been arrested together on unspecified charges. In light of the likelihood of prejudice to defendants by reason of the introduction of such evidence, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, and will reverse the judgment.

On August 12, 1975, defendants became engaged in a fight with Joe Watson and Allen Holinsworth. During the struggle, Watson was cut and Holinsworth was fatally stabbed in the heart. Defendants were each charged with murder while armed with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 187,12022) and with assault with a deadly weapon

(id.,

§ 245, subd. (a)). Following a jury trial, defendants were found not guilty of the assault on Watson, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser and necessarily

[650]

included offense to murder; the juiy further found that both defendants were armed with a deadly weapon when the offense occurred.

At trial, the testimony (by victim Watson, several eyewitnesses, and defendants themselves) was conflicting. Prosecution witnesses indicated that during the fight defendant Anderson seized a knife from Watson and gave it to defendant Davis, who used it to stab Holinsworth and cut Watson. Evidence that Anderson had handed Davis a knife was disputed by defense testimony to the effect that Davis, in self-defense, managed to wrest the knife from Holinsworth, who accidentally fell on it.

During cross-examination of defendant Anderson, and over defendants’ objection, the prosecutor was permitted to elicit the information that Anderson twice had been arrested with defendant Davis on other unspecified charges. The prosecutor’s theory of relevancy was that the evidence of prior “joint” arrests established a “close affinity” between the codefendants, a fact which, it was contended, bore on their credibility by implying a bias or prejudice. Concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code, § 352), the trial court overruled defendants’ objection and in doing so it abused its discretion.