Urquiza v. Industrial Accident Commission

BRAY, J.

Petitioner seeks review and the annulment of an order of the Industrial Accident Commission determining that prior to an industrial injury he had no permanent disability entitling him to compensation from the Subsequent Injuries Fund.

[323]

Questions Presented

1. Does section 4751, Labor Code,

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apply to an injured employee who suffers from a prior existing disease or physical condition which in no wise was work disabling?

2. Did the employer know of the preexisting injury?

Record

While working for the L. C. Smith Company petitioner received an industrial injury which cost him the sight of one eye. The commission, in effect, found that the injury in no wise lighted up or affected the previous condition hereinafter discussed, and awarded petitioner a 36% per cent disability. Petitioner does not question this award. Petitioner then sought a ruling that the combined effect of his previous “disability” and his industrial injury equaled more than 70 per cent of total disability and that therefore he was entitled to compensation from the Subsequent Injuries Fund. It is from the commission’s order, after reconsideration, denying him this relief, that petitioner appeals.

On April 25,1944, petitioner was committed to Agnew State Hospital. His condition was diagnosed as dementia praecox, paranoid type. September 25th he was granted an indefinite leave of absence from the hospital. Sometime in 1947 he returned to work for Smith and continued to work there steadily until his injury.

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On February 8, 1948, he was discharged from Agnew as “improved.”

All of the medical men who examined petitioner after his injury agree that at all times subsequent to his commitment to Agnew and at the time of his injury petitioner was suffering from chronic dementia praecox, paranoid type, but that his condition was not a disabling factor in the field of normal labor. Petitioner worked as a laborer and truck driver. Since his injury he is still suffering from the mental