In Re Roberts

GIBSON, C. J.

In June 1950 Roberts was arraigned before the Superior Court of Los Angeles County on an information containing three counts of forgery and a charge of prior conviction for theft of an automobile in violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code. Two of the counts were dismissed after Roberts pleaded guilty to the third count and admitted the prior conviction. The court suspended proceedings without pronouncing judgment and put Roberts on probation for five years. Thereafter he was arrested for violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2311-2313) and was placed in the Los Angeles county jail to await trial on the federal charge. On June 25, 1951, after revocation of probation, Roberts was taken before the superior court, which pronounced judgment on the forgery charge and sentenced him for the term prescribed by law. Although Roberts was represented by an attorney at all prior proceedings, he was without counsel when judgment and sentence were pronounced.

By this proceeding in habeas corpus Roberts seeks his release from San Quentin, where he is now confined, contending that the trial court was without jurisdiction to pronounce judgment on the forgery charge because it failed to act within 30 days after being notified that he had been placed in jail on the federal charge, that he was unlawfully taken from the jail where he was being held under federal authority and brought before the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and that he was deprived of counsel at the time judgment and sentence were pronounced.

Roberts asserts that the superior court was notified on May 20,1951, that he had been put in jail by the federal authorities pending trial for violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, and that since he had been granted probation on the forgery charge and no sentence had been previously imposed, section 1203.2a of the Penal Code required the court to pronounce judgment within 30 days after receipt of such notice. Section 1203.2a provides that the court which has released a defendant on probation must sentence him

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within. 30 days after receiving notice of his commitment for another offense or be deprived of any jurisdiction over him in the case in which he was granted probation. The section, however, applies only to a probationer who is subsequently “committed to a prison” following conviction on another charge, and it does not require a court to act within the specified time where, as here, there has been merely an arrest and detention of the probationer pending trial. (See