Covina Manor, Inc. v. Hatch

PATROSSO, J.

Action in unlawful detainer to recover possession of a dwelling house, wherein plaintiff recovered judgment for restitution of the premises and damages in the sum of $1,470, from which defendants appeal.

The record discloses that defendant William T. Hatch was employed by plaintiff sometime prior to December 5, 1952, and remained in its employ until June 19, 1953, when his employment was terminated. Just what his duties were is not clear from the record, but he is described by an officer of the plaintiff “as a sort of a maintenance man—he had several duties.” The circumstances surrounding defendants’ occupancy of the house is left in equal obscurity; the testimony on the subject adduced upon behalf of plaintiff being merely to the effect that on or about March 1, 1953, Mr. Hatch was granted “oral permission to move into the premises in question”; that there was no “agreement with regard to rent at the time he [defendant] took possession”; and that defendants never agreed to or paid any rent therefor.

Upon termination of Mr. Hatch’s employment, plaintiff demanded possession of the premises, and upon defendants’ refusal to surrender the same plaintiff caused to be served

*Supp. 792

upon defendants a three-day notice, dated June 23, 1953, to pay rent at the rate of $200 per month for the month beginning June 20,1953, or quit possession of the premises. Despite this notice defendants remained in possession without payment of rent, and on March 25, 1954, the present action was instituted. The complaint makes no mention of the three-day notice referred to above, alleging that the defendants occupied the premises under an oral license from plaintiff, and that the latter terminated such license on June 19, 1953. Defendants’ answer denies the material allegations of the complaint and alleges that on March 1, 1953, the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby defendant Mr. Hatch was to act as sales agent for the plaintiff in the sale of 50 houses located in a described tract in consideration of the conveyance to defendants of the property in question “subject only to the first and second trust deeds thereon” plus “$100 per house, ’ ’ and defendants entered into possession of the premises pursuant to such agreement. Upon the trial, however, the court unduly restricted defendants in the proof of the agreement alleged, upon the ground that such agreement was invalid or unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Defendant was, however, permitted to testify that he was “to secure money or building for them (plaintiff) to secure a tract under the name of Covina Manor, Incorporated, in Covina, and they were in turn to give me an agreement to have a house that I was to occupy up to the—that is, the house that I am now occupying up to the first—that is, I was to have that house up to the first and second mortgage, and the right to sell houses at $100.00 a house.” Defendant further testified that he thereupon moved into the housé in question, but upon objection was precluded from testifying further as to his conversation with plaintiff as to what he was to do with respect to the house. Assuming that the agreement was invalid for the reason suggested, the evidence was nonetheless admissible for the purpose of showing the circumstances under which defendant went into possession, as will hereafter appear.