Guardianship of Morro

SHENK, J.

This is a petition for a writ of

supersedeas

to stay the enforcement of an order directing execution and delivery by the appellants of a certain grant deed pending appeal from said order.

On September 30, 1937, Dominic Morro applied to the Superior Court in Los Angeles County for the appointment of himself as guardian of the person and estate of Bartolomeo Morro, an alleged incompetent. His petition showed that the alleged incompetent’s estate consisted of two parcels of land in the county of Los Angeles and one parcel in Tulare County, title to which was held in the name of Martha Morro, a daughter of the incompetent, and that said Martha Morro also had in her possession the sum of $3,250 belonging to the incompetent; that there were pending in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County two actions, Nos. 420565 and 420568, brought by Bartolomeo Morro as plaintiff against Martha Morro, whereby he sought to recover title to the real property and a judgment for the moneys hereinabove mentioned.

Martha Morro and another daughter, Madeline Rowe, contested the appointment sought by Dominie Morro. The matter was heard before the court sitting in probate.

On October 25, 1937, a minute order was entered declaring Bartolomeo Morro incompetent and the owner of the real and personal property referred to, and appointing Mrs. Madeline Rowe and Albert Morro guardians of the estate of the incompetent, and Dominic Morro guardian of his person. Pursuant to stipulation the court also ordered guardians Madeline Rowe and Albert Morro to accept on behalf of the

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incompetent an offer to transfer $2,400 cash and deeds to the three parcels of real property to be executed by Martha Morro and Madeline Rowe.

On December 23, 1937, an order appointing the persons named as guardians was entered. That order incorporated the foregoing provisions of the minute order and directed conveyance of the real property and delivery of the sum of $2,400 by Martha Morro and Madeline Rowe.

Subsequently, Martha Morro moved to set aside the order of December 23, 1937; but the motion was denied on the ground that the order was a consent decree.