Lee v. O'Hara

GIBSON, C. J.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered upon the sustaining of a general demurrer without leave to amend.

The allegations of the complaint may be summarized as fóllows: Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and of the State of California and is a member of the Negro race. Defendants, who are licensed real estate brokers with offices in San Francisco, were retained in that capacity to rent certain described premises to any member of the public ready, willing, and able to rent such premises upon the terms offered. In February 1961 plaintiff requested defendants to procure possession of the premises for him upon the offered terms, and defendants refused to rent to plaintiff solely because of his race.

Section 51 of the Civil Code, as amended in 1959 by the Unruh Civil Rights Act, provides in part: “All persons within

[478]

the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. ’ ’ Section 52 provides that whoever denies the rights declared in section 51, or aids or incites such a denial, is liable for each offense for actual damages and, in addition, $250.

We held in

Burks

v.

Poppy Construction Co., ante,

p. 463 [20 Cal.Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313], that the Unruh Civil Rights Act is valid and applies to real estate transactions. Defendants contend, however, that real estate brokers acting as such do not come within the purview of the act.

The inclusion in section 51 of the words “all” and “of every kind whatsoever,” without any exception and without specification of particular kinds of enterprises, leaves no doubt that the term was used in the broadest sense reasonably possible.

(Burks

v.