Jones v. Board of Trustees
Before: Fricke
FRICKE, J.,
pro tem.
Respondent was for some years employed as a permanent teacher of music in one of the schools of Culver City. On May 11, 1933, appellant board passed a resolution “That the subject of music be discontinued in the schools of this district at the end of this school year”, and instructed the clerk of the district to notify respondent that she was dismissed, the dismissal to become effective at the end of the school year “by reason of the discontinuance of the subject of music”. Respondent was given written notice of this action and was not permitted to begin teaching her subject at the opening of the following school year. She brought this action for writ of mandate to be admitted to her employment as a permanent full-time teacher of music. The trial court granted the writ and also gave judgment for the amount of her salary for the months preceding the trial, which took place in July, 1934.
It appears that during the school year of 1933-34, following the action of the school board, the subject of music was not discontinued at the school but that the instruction in this subject was given by other teachers in addition to their teaching of other subjects.
The first question raised is whether under section 5.710 of the School Code respondent could be dismissed. That section, so far as applicable here, provides that “whenever it becomes necessary to decrease the number of permanent employees in a school district ... on account of the discontinuance of a particular service in such district the governing board may dismiss such employee at the close of the school year”. Does this case involve “the discontinuance of a particular kind of service”? An examination of the various passages of the School Code “shows that ‘to teach’ is ‘to
[148]
serve’ and
vice versa,
and that ‘services’ of the teacher are ‘teaching’ and ‘teaching’ is ‘services’ ”.
(Fuller
v.
Berkeley School District,
2 Cal. (2d) 152 [40 Pac. (2d) 831].) Section 5.710 would seem, therefore, to include the discontinuance of a particular kind of teaching,- and is not limited to the discontinuance of the teaching of a particular subject. Thus by a change in the method of teaching or in the particular kind of service in teaching a subject, there is a discontinuance of the former “particular kind of .service”
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