In Re Kirschke

Opinion

THE COURT.

This is a proceeding to review a recommendation of the Disciplinaiy Board of the State Bar that petitioner be disbarred. He was admitted to practice law in this state in 1956.

Petitioner was convicted in a jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) for shooting his wife and her lover. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in an unpublished opinion, and his petition for hearing in this court was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for writs of habeas corpus and

coram nobis.

After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, the Court of Appeal unanimously concurred

(In re Kirschke

(1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 405 [125 Cal.Rptr. 680]), and we again denied a hearing.

When this court received record of petitioner’s conviction, we noted that his crime involved moral turpitude and suspended him from the practice of law under the authority of Business and Professions Code section 6102, subdivision (a). Upon the finality of petitioner’s conviction, we ordered him to show cause why a final disciplinary order should not be made. He filed a response, requesting a delay pending the outcome of his habeas corpus proceeding in the trial court. After relief was denied in that proceeding, we referred the matter to the State Bar on the issue of

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discipline. Following hearings, a local administrative committee unanimously recommended disbarment, and the disciplinary board, by an 11-1 vote, concurred.

Section 6102, subdivision (b), provides that if this court finds an attorney has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, it shall “enter an order disbarring the attorney or suspending him from practice for a limited time, according to the gravity of the crime and the circumstances of the case; . . .” We have twice determined—in our interim suspension of petitioner and in our order to him to show cause why he should not be disciplined—that the murder he stands convicted of committing involved moral turpitude. Petitioner does not dispute this conclusion.