Arenson v. National Automobile & Casualty Insurance
Before: Gibson
GIBSON, C. J.
— Plaintiff, holder of a personal liability insurance policy issued by defendant company, brought this action for a declaration of his rights and a determination of defendant’s liability under the policy. The court concluded that defendant was not liable, ,and judgment was entered accordingly.
The policy was issued to plaintiff as the named insured, and stated that “The unqualified word ‘insured’ includes (a) the named insured, (b) if residents of his household, his spouse, the relatives of either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in the care of an insured. ...” Defendant agreed to pay all sums up to $10,000 which the insured should become obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed upon him by law, including damages for injury to property, and to defend any suit brought against him in Which such injury was alleged. One exclusion provision read, “This policy does not apply: ... (c) to injury, sickness,
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disease, death or destruction caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured. ...”
Plaintiff’s minor son started a fire which injured school property, and the school district obtained a judgment against plaintiff for the amount of the damage.
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The insurance company refused to defend the suit or to pay the amount of the judgment, claiming that the injury was caused intentionally by an insured and therefore came within the exclusion provision.
The company takes the position that the words “the insured,” appearing in the provision which excludes liability for injuries “caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured,” refer to a class composed of all those covered by the policy, so that none of them may recover where an injury is caused intentionally by any member of the class. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the exclusion provision does not preclude an insured who has not participated in an intentional injury from being indemnified against liability for an injury intentionally committed by another insured and, furthermore, that there is nothing in the record hére which discloses that the son’s act was intentional. We have concluded that the policy protects the named insured against liability for intentional injury committed by another insured, and, accordingly, it will be unnecessary to consider whether the son’s act was in fact intentional.
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