Griffiths v. Crawford

California Court of Appeal Dec 10, 1935 No. Civ. 10082Published

Before: Roth

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Holding. The court held that the evidence supported the trial court's findings that the respondent was not contributorily negligent and that the damages awarded were not excessive. The appellate court will not disturb findings of fact if they are supported by any evidence or reasonable inference.

Issues

Whether the respondent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for crossing the street outside of a crosswalk.
Whether the damages awarded to the respondent were excessive.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The finding of these facts in respondent’s favor is sufficient to establish her freedom from contributory negligence.”

“If there is any evidence in the record, or any reasonable inference to be drawn from such evidence, to sustain the findings of the trial court they cannot be disturbed here.”

“We find nothing in the record to indicate passion or prejudice.”

ROTH, J.,

pro tem.

Edna Griffiths (who will be referred to herein as respondent) was struck by an automobile operated by appellant Crawford, an employee of appellant Melone Co., a corporation, as she was crossing Broadway from the north to the south between Locust Street and Tribune Court, all public streets in the city of Long Beach, at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon of September 2, 1933. In an action brought for personal injuries, the trial was commenced before a jury. The jury was thereafter, upon stipulation of counsel, dismissed, and the trial was finished by the court alone, which gave judgment to respondent in the sum of $5,000, and to her husband, respondent Charles D. Griffiths, who was joined as plaintiff, in the sum of $178.55, against both appellants.

The judgment is attacked on two grounds: First, that the $5,000 awarded to respondent is excessive; and second, that the entire judgment is void because the evidence shows contributory negligence as a matter of law on the part of respondent. The record shows without dispute that respondent crossed Broadway between the two streets, and

[545]

at the time mentioned it is admitted that there was no crosswalk at the point selected by respondent, and that her action in crossing at the place which she selected was in violation of a city ordinance of the city of Long Beach, requiring pedestrians to cross at street intersections or at crosswalks provided for that purpose. Respondent admits the ordinance, but calls attention to the fact that section 131% of the California Vehicle Act does not make a crossing under such circumstances negligence

per se,

but merely requires a pedestrian who does cross under such circumstances to yield the right of way to vehicles using the street. Respondent’s point in this regard is that even if such action on her part was negligent, it does not necessarily follow that such negligence contributed to the accident and the consequent injuries. This is of course the law.

(Skaggs

Wiley,

108 Cal. App. 429, 433 [292 Pac. 132];

Griffiths v. Crawford

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ROTH, J.,

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