Henderson v. Henderson

California Court of Appeal May 17, 1948 No. Civ. 13526Published

Before: Dooling

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Holding. The court held that a default judgment is not subject to collateral attack for errors in pleading, property description, or uncertainty if the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Because the appellant's motions were made more than six months after entry of judgment, they constituted a collateral attack, and the judgment was not void on its face.

Issues

Whether a default judgment is subject to collateral attack for alleged errors in property description or uncertainty.
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to determine property rights in an annulment action involving real property located in a different county.
Whether the alleged conduct of counsel constituted extrinsic fraud sufficient to vacate a default judgment.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“On such attack the appellant can only succeed, except in the case of extrinsic fraud or mistake, if the judgment is void on the face of the judgment-roll itself.”

“If a complaint shows a subject matter and a demand for relief within the jurisdiction of the court, the mere fact that it fails to state a cause of action does not render the judgment void and subject to indirect or collateral attack.”

“A mere erroneous decision on a question of law . . . does not make the judgment void, if the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant.”

DO CLING, J.

Appeals are herein presented from three orders denying defendant’s motions to vacate and set aside a default judgment and to correct and modify said judgment.

In 1942, the respondent and appellant herein were ceremonially married in Nevada. Thereafter they lived together

[478]

as husband and wife. On February 19, 1946, respondent filed a complaint in the superior court in San Francisco seeking an annulment of the marriage on the ground that at the time of their marriage the appellant was married to another. Joined in this complaint was an allegation that respondent had contributed $13,000 which had been invested and reinvested by the parties and that “the accruals from said investment and reinvestment now aggregate the sum of approximately $14,000, represented by cash in bank, equity in real and personal property, situated in Shasta County, California, and standing in the joint names of the plaintiff and defendant herein, and one 1941 Model Pontiac Automobile standing in the name of defendant herein. ’ ’ The complaint further alleges that the respondent permitted the property to stand in the joint names of the parties, and the automobile in the name of the appellant, believing in good faith that she was appellant’s legal wife and that she did not intend them as a gift.

The complaint prays: 1. that the marriage be declared void; 2. that the court restore to plaintiff “the sum of $13,-000.00 which was her separate property at the time of said marriage”; 3. “that this court make its order awarding all of the accruals from the said $13,000.00 aforesaid in the approximate value of $14,000.00 to this plaintiff.”

The appellant, after personal service on him of the complaint and summons, defaulted by failure to appear or plead. After a trial the court entered a judgment annulling the marriage and decreeing the following with regard to property rights: 1. that the $13,000 mentioned in the complaint is the sole and separate property of the plaintiff; 2. “that all of the accruals from the said sum of $13,000.00 in the approximate value of $14,000.00—all as set out and specified in plaintiff’s complaint on file herein, be and the same is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed to be the sole and separate property of said plaintiff”; 3. “that all of that certain real property described as follows, and situated in the Town of Castella, County of Shasta, State of California, to wit: (followed by a specific description) be, and the same is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed to be the sole property of the said plaintiff . . . and that the joint-tenancy of the parties in said real property be and the same is hereby terminated”; 4. that the Pontiac automobile referred to in the complaint is the sole and separate property of plaintiff.

Henderson v. Henderson

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DO CLING, J.

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