Rosher v. Superior Court

THE COURT.

This ease was transferred to this court after hearing and decision by the district court of appeal, second district, division two, in order that we might give further consideration to the question of the effect of the amendment of section 25 of the Civil Code (Stats. 1927, p. 1119) raising the age of majority for females from eighteen to twenty-one years, upon a support order in a divorce action made prior to its effective date.

The case is here on proceedings to review an order adjudging petitioner to be in contempt of court for failure to pay the amount specified in the order. Lolita H. Rosher obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from petitioner in 1923. At that time the court awarded her the custody of their minor daughter and ordered petitioner to pay $100 a month for the child’s support during "her minority, or until her marriage. On April 8, 1927, the order was modified to raise the monthly sum to $150 to continue “until further order of the court”, instead of until majority. Both at the time of the original order and at the time of its modification in April, 1927, section 25 of the Civil Code fixed eighteen years as the age of majority for females. The amendment raising the age to twenty-one became effective July 29, 1927. Dorothy Lacey Rosher, daughter of plaintiff and petitioner, was born July 10, 1914, and was about nine years old at the time of the divorce decree and the original support order. She became eighteen years of age in July, 1932, and twenty-one in July, 1935. The petitioner made payments in accordance with the orders until and including December, 1932. The contempt found by the court below consists in his wilful refusal to make payments thereafter. It is the contention of petitioner, that since at the time of the rendition of the original decree, eighteen was the age of majority for females, his obligation to make payments under the order ceased when his daughter attained that age.

Petitioner relies upon the case of

Kendall

v.

Kendall,

122 Cal. App. 397, 398 [10 Pac. (2d) 131]. That ease is undoubtedly squarely in point. It held that the amendment of section 25 of the Civil Code could not be applied retroactively

[559]