People v. Dutton

LANGDON, J.

Defendant was charged with the violation of section 476a of the Penal Code, and with a prior conviction of forgery, a felony, in Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to the crime charged, but sought to avoid the effect of the prior conviction by proof of a pardon given by the governor of the state. The court found that he had suffered a prior conviction, and in his appeal, defendant attacks this finding, which, if it stands, requires the imposition upon defendant of a punishment heavier than that prescribed for a first offender, and renders him ineligible for probation. (Pen. Code, sees. 1168, 1203.)

This appeal presents the same issue considered by us in

People

v.

Biggs et al.,

Crim. No. 4100

(post,

p. 508 [71 Pac. (2d) 214]), this day decided. In accordance with the conclusion reached in that opinion, we hold that despite his pardon, defendant has suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of the above cited sections of the Penal Code.

Defendant in the instant case advances several contentions not made in the Biggs case. He urges, first, that the trial court denied full faith and credit to the act of the governor of Wisconsin, in violation .of article IV, section 1, of the federal Constitution. No authority is cited to support the remarkable assertion that California, in determining the appropriate punishment for a person convicted of crime in this state, is denying effect to acts of the chief executive of Wisconsin. He pardoned the defendant for the first offense; this state punishes him for the second offense only, and full faith and credit is not involved.

[507]

The second contention, that defendant is denied equal protection of the laws, is likewise made without citation of authority or discussion. It is obviously without merit, and, moreover, the constitutionality of just such an application of a statute punishing subsequent offenders is definitely established. (Ca

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