Reardon v. Melbourne

California Court of Appeal Jul 2, 1942 No. Civ. 2822Published

Before: Marks

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Holding. The court held that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a valid equitable cause of action for specific performance, and the inclusion of such a claim was a mere attempt to improperly confer jurisdiction on the superior court for a matter otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court.

Issues

Whether the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case where the only equitable claim was legally insufficient and abandoned by the plaintiffs.
Whether a plaintiff can confer jurisdiction on the superior court by pleading an imaginary equitable cause of action alongside a claim for a money judgment below the jurisdictional threshold.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The jurisdiction of the trial court must depend on the purported cause of action for specific performance, for the maximum amount of money judgments sought against both defendants was far short of $2,000”

“Plaintiffs’ pleading did not state an equitable cause of action. It only hinted at one. Plaintiffs admitted they had no such cause of action. Having none they should not have attempted to plead one.”

MARKS, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Thomas M. Reardon against L. A. Melbourne for $162.50.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint attempts to state four causes of action.

In the first cause of action it is alleged that Reardon is a duly licensed real estate broker; that on January 21, 1940, Reardon and Melbourne entered into a contract concerning the sale of real property in San Diego and that Melbourne signed a memorandum in writing agreeing to pay Reardon $162.50 commission if he found a buyer at the price of $3,250; that Reardon procured his co-plaintiff, Joseph C.

[258]

Ventura, as a buyer, “who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the said property and has tendered the purchase price”; that Melbourne refused to pay Reardon the commission of $162.50.

The second cause of action incorporated the allegation of the first by reference and alleged that when Melbourne agreed to pay Reardon the commission he was acting in his own behalf and not as agent and wrongfully held himself out as acting for and on behalf of the real owner of the real estate.

The third cause of action incorporated therein by reference paragraphs I, II, and III of the first cause of action which alleged residence of plaintiffs in San Diego, that Rear-don was a licensed real estate broker and that Melbourne signed the written memorandum to pay the commission. It was further alleged that the other defendant, Martha J. Reichmuth, was the owner of the real property; that she ‘1 entered into a contract in writing to sell the said real property in the city of San Diego, State of California, for the sum of $3,250.00; that the plaintiff, Joseph C. Ventura, contracted and agreed to buy the said real property for the said sum; that he is ready, willing and able to buy the said property, has tendered a purchase price” and that defendant Reichmuth refused to sell it; that Ventura has been damaged by such refusal by being deprived of the rentals at the rate of $40 per month “and that he is entitled to specific performance of the said contract.”

The fourth cause of action incorporated by reference the allegations of the first cause of action and alleged that in agreeing to pay Reardon a commission Melbourne “was acting, as the agent lawfully authorized of defendant, Martha J. Reichmuth”; that the commission is due and owing Rear-don from her.

Reardon v. Melbourne

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MARKS, J.

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