SHENK, J. These are habeas corpus proceedings in which petitioners seek release from custody resulting from their arrest for picketing in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the superior court in an action pending therein entitled Isthmian Steamship Co. et al. v. National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. et al.
The restraining order was issued on the basis of the verified complaint of plaintiffs in the action, and we turn, therefore, to it to ascertain the facts. Plaintiff, Isthmian Steamship Company, is a corporation engaged in the business of operating steamships as a common carrier of interstate and foreign commerce and a part of that business is conducted in California. Plaintiff, Seaboard Stevedoring Corporation, is a corporation engaged in loading and unloading steamships, known as stevedoring, and has a contract with Isthmian to load and unload its vessels in this state. Defendants are a labor union operating as an unincorporated association known as National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, referred to herein as M.E.B.A., Marine Engineers Beneficial Association No. 97, called Local 97, which is a labor organization operating as a corporation and affiliated with, and a local unit of, M.E.B.A. and also affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, known as C.I.O., and the officers and members of those organizations. The Brotherhood of Marine Engineers, referred to as B.M.E., is an unincorporated labor organization or union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. None of the unions are financed or controlled by plaintiffs. The members of the M.E.B.A. and B.M.E. are marine engineers whose work is later described herein.
[426]Isthmian in its business employs licensed marine engineers who are officers in charge of engineroom departments on its steamships and as such “have authority, in the interest of Isthmian, effectively to recommend the transfer, suspension, promotion, discharge, assignment, reward and discipline of other employees, to wit, unlicensed engineroom personnel. Such engineers also have authority responsibly to direct unlicensed engineroom personnel and do so direct such personnel in the ordinary performance of their duties. The exercise by the said engineers of the authority referred to in the next two preceding sentences is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. ’ ’
Prior to July 15, 1951, Isthmian had a collective bargaining agreement with M.E.B.A. which by its terms expired on that day. Prior to March, 1950, the B.M.E. commenced soliciting plaintiffs’ marine engineer employees for membership in it. In March and April of that year Isthmian conducted a vote among its engineers to ascertain whether they desired M.E.B.A. or B.M.E. to represent them as collective bargaining representative, which resulted in a victory for M.E.B.A. Nevertheless, B.M.E. continued to solicit for members among Isthmian’s engineers, and on May 14, 1951, advised Isthmian that it had a majority, but Isthmian continued to recognize and deal with M.E.B.A. under the bargaining contract with it. About two months before the expiration of that contract M.E.B.A. demanded provisions for a hiring hall and closed shop in a new contract. Isthmian refused, and on July 16, 1951, M.E.B.A. called a strike of the former’s engineers, and commenced picketing its vessels. By letter, on August 2, 1951, B.M.E. renewed its demand to represent Isthmian’s engineers, and on August 15th, the latter requested proof of its right to representation, whereupon B.M.E. exhibited pledge cards signed by 128 of Isthmian’s 204 engineers and accordingly B.M.E. and Isthmian entered into a collective bargaining contract which did not contain" closed shop or hiring hall clauses. M.E.B.A. was advised of that contract but continued to picket and demanded that it be recognized as exclusive bargaining agent. The B.M.E. have also picketed vessels whose owners recognize M.E.B.A. It is alleged that the picketing of Isthmian by M.E.B.A. “arises out of a controversy • between the M.E.B.A. and the B.M.E. as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to bargain with Isthmian, [427]as an employer, on behalf of licensed marine engineers, as employees of Isthmian.”
As a result of the picketing, longshoremen employed by plaintiff Seaboard Stevedoring Corporation, have refused to cross the picket lines and Isthmian has been unable to load or tinload its vessels to the injury of its business.
The temporary restraining order issued on August 29, 1951, enjoined defendants from picketing for the purpose of inducing Isthmian to recognize them as the exclusive bargaining agent for its engineers in violation of its agreement with B.M.E. pending a hearing of an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Petitioners, in violation of the order, were picketing on August 30th and were arrested for violating the statute which provides that: “Every person guilty of any contempt of court, of either of the following kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor: . . . 4. Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any court.” (Pen. Code, § 166[4].)
On the assumption that the restraining order was based on the Jurisdictional Strike Law (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120), petitioners assert that that law is unconstitutional and that it does not apply to the facts in the instant case.
As pointed out in Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers Union, ante, p. 368 [254 P.2d. 544], the Jurisdictional Strike Law defines a labor organization (Lab. Code, § 1117), declares a jurisdictional strike as therein defined to be unlawful and against public policy (Id. § 1115), and gives a person injured by its violation the right to injunctive relief (Id., § 1116). A jurisdictional strike is defined as “a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer or any other concerted interference with an employer’s operation or business, arising out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have its members perform work for an employer.” (Id., § 1118.) We held that that law did not violate the free speech, press and assembly guaranties of the Constitution in the Seven Up ease. Petitioners assert, however, that the picketing here involved did not arise out of a dispute between two unions as required by section 1118, because the dispute between Isthmian and M.E.B.A. which resulted in the strike and picketing on [428]July 16, 1951, and thereafter, all existed prior to the entry of B.M.E. on the scene; that the dispute at that time was solely between Isthmian and M.E.B.A. over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, as the election in April, 1950, among Isthmian’s engineers had resulted in victory for M.E.B.A. and B.M.E. was therefore out of the picture.
We cannot agree. As seen, it is alleged in the complaint that after the election and collective bargaining agreement with M.E.B.A., B.M.E. continued to solicit Isthmian’s employees for members, and in May, 1951, told Isthmian it had a majority. In August, 1951, after the strike was called and picketing commenced. B.M.E. renewed its demand on Isthmian that it recognize it as bargaining agent and furnished proof that it represented a majority, which resulted in a collective bargaining agreement between B.M.E. and Isthmian. M.E.B.A. was advised of that contract but “has continued to insist that it is the collective bargaining representative of licensed marine engineers employed by plaintiff Isthmian, and has continued picketing Isthmian’s vessels,” and finally it is alleged, as heretofore quoted, that the picketing arises out of a dispute between M.E.B.A. and B.M.E. While it may have been a dispute between Isthmian and M.E.B.A. alone over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement which initiated the picketing, it has now become a dispute between M.E.B.A. and B.M.E. as to which should represent Isthmian’s engineers, and the picketing thus arises out of a dispute between two labor organizations. True, M.E.B.A. wanted certain clauses in a new collective bargaining contract when it called the strike, but now B.M.E. insists on its right to be the exclusive bargaining agent and has a contract, and it follows that the dispute over the terms of a contract drop into the background because M.E.B.A. would have to be the representative of Isthmian’s engineers and recognized as such before any effective action could be taken concerning the terms of the contract. That is to say, the dispute is now between it and B.M.E. as to which one shall be bargaining agent for the engineers. M.E.B.A.’s demand for a closed shop and hiring hall necessarily means that it be the exclusive bargaining representative. The facts do not present a case where the employer invoked the interference by another union (B.M.E.) to create a jurisdictional strike situation. On the contrary, B.M.E., as far as appears, acted entirely on its own. Isthmian entered into a contract with B.M.E. because it furnished proof that it represented a ma[429]jority of its engineers rather than as a means of creating a jurisdictional dispute. DeWilde v. Scranton Bldg. Trades etc. Council, 343 Pa. 224 [22 A.2d 897], relied upon by petitioners, is not in point. There Pennsylvania had a law barring injunctions in labor disputes except disputes in disregard or breach of a collective bargaining agreement. An A.F. of L. union claimed it had a contract with the employer and the employer entered into a contract with a C.I.O. union. The court held the exception did not apply because the purpose of it was to protect the employer from activities by the employees or their representatives in violation of an existing agreement between them, that is, to in some measure insure compliance with the contract.
It is contended that the Jurisdictional Strike Law does not apply, because the engineers are supervisory employees ; that Isthmian is engaged in interstate commerce, and under the National Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.) no state can regulate such disputes between such employees and an employer. Reliance is placed particularly on the section reading: “Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this sub-chapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.” (29 U.S.C.A., § 164[a].) Hence the state law—the Jurisdictional Strike Law—applies. Moreover, it is clear that the claim of petitioners avails them nothing, for accepting their contention, the second clause of the section says that the employer shall not be compelled to treat supervisory employees as employees for the purpose of a law, federal or local. The Jurisdictional Strike Act does not compel the employer to so treat his engineers. If any protection would flow from the second clause it would inure to the benefit of the employer rather than the employees or their union.
The writs heretofore issued herein are discharged and the petitioners are remanded to custody.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.