Taylor v. Superior Court

[149]

SCHAUER, J.

Petitioner seeks prohibition, pursuant to the rule laid down in

Scott

v.

Industrial Acc. Com.

(Feb. 3, 1956), 46 Cal.2d 76, 81, 89 [293 P.2d 18], to halt proceedings in the superior court in an action brought against petitioner to recover for personal injuries. The Scott case holds that where two tribunals in this state have concurrent jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, the question of which shall have exclusive jurisdiction shall be determined by the tribunal whose jurisdiction was first invoked, and proceedings in the tribunal whose jurisdiction was subsequently sought will, if not voluntarily stayed, be halted by prohibition until final determination of the jurisdictional question by the tribunal where jurisdiction was first laid. We have concluded that the superior court is precluded from proceeding in the action before it, and that the writ sought by petitioner should issue.

The petition for the writ alleges, so far as here material, that on March 29, 1954, one McVey filed with the Industrial Accident Commission an “Application for Hearing” in which he named petitioner as his employer and alleged that McVey was injured on December 31,1953, and had received compensation in the sum of $169.50. At a commission hearing on November 5,1954, all parties admitted that on December 31, 1953, McVey was employed by petitioner and sustained compensable injury; issues for hearing were stated; and the matter was continued.

The petition further alleges that on December 28, 1954, McVey filed a superior court action against petitioner, “based on the same alleged accident as set forth in the Industrial Accident Commission proceeding. ’ ’ In the complaint in such action McVey alleges that on December 31, 1953, he was employed by the United States Forestry Service and was injured by the negligence of petitioner. Petitioner answered, alleging as an affirmative defense that the commission has “exclusive jurisdiction over . . . [the subject] matter.” Although this plea, if substantiated, would constitute a defense in the superior court it is a defense which, under the Scott ease and in view of the prior inception of the commission proceeding, could be finally determined only after the Industrial Accident Commission had ruled on the question. In the meantime, however, it would be incumbent upon the superior court to stay proceedings before it.