Wilmot v. Golden Gate Investment Co.

NOURSE, P. J.

In an action for damages for personal injuries tried before a jury plaintiff had a verdict for $6,000 against the defendant corporation and Louis Travis. The trial court reduced the verdict to $4,500. The defendant corporation alone appeals.

[666]

Edward Cornblum, as president, and Heim Goldman, as secretary, entered into a written contract with a landowner to construct a house on the owner’s premises. At the request of the corporation a bond was executed in its name for the faithful performance of the contract. The president, Cornblum, was unable to procure such a bond. The contract was negotiated for and on behalf of the corporation by Cornblum. The owner financed the building through the Palo Alto Mutual Building and Loan Association. Payments on the contract were made by this association to the corporation and receipted for by it. During the course of construction Pegan was employed as boss carpenter. At the instance of Cornblum, Travis was employed to help him. Wilmot had been employed to do the roofing. As Wilmot stood alongside of the structure discussing the selection of tile to be used on the roof, Travis sawed a “2x4” rafter in two. One end slipped from the roof and struck plaintiff causing the injuries complained of. Travis testified that, as the piece of rafter fell, he called out “look out below”. Plaintiff testified that he did not hear the warning. The defendant Cornblum testified that he alone was the building contractor. That he procured the execution of the contract in the name of the corporation because he was unable to furnish a personal bond. That soon after the contract was executed he had the corporation assign it to him.

The main contention of the corporation on this appeal is that, based on the testimony which it introduced on this issue, the evidence as a whole was insufficient to sustain the verdict against the corporation. The argument is based on the supposition that the jury must have believed this testimony. By its verdict the jury plainly indicated that it did not believe it. The testimony of the palpable fraud which the corporation and its president engaged in to deceive the owner, the bonding company, and all those employed under the contract, was sufficient to warrant the rejection by the jury of the testimony above referred to. In our statement of facts we have recited the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and in the light which the jury by its verdict indicated that the evidence had been weighed and found true. This evidence is sufficient to support the finding on the issue of the corporation’s liability. ■