Kaluzok v. Brisson

[762]

SHENK, J.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for a change of place of trial.

The action was commenced in Riverside County. The motion was for a change of venue to Los Angeles County] on the ground that the defendants were residents of that county. On the hearing of the motion it was conceded that the individual defendants are residents of Los Angeles County and that the corporate defendant has its principal place of business in that county. However, the real property described in the complaint is situated in Riverside County. The question is whether the action is local (Code Civ. Proc., § 392, subd. 1) or transitory (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. 1). If it is local the motion was properly denied. If it is transitory the defendants are entitled to have it tried in Los Angeles County.

To decide the question it is necessary to determine the nature of the action as disclosed by the complaint, and the scope of the judgment which might be entered on default

(Neet

v.

Holmes,

19 Cal.2d 605 [122 P.2d 557];

Eckstrand

v.

Wilshusen,

217 Cal. 380 [18 P.2d 931];

Grocers’ Fruit Growing Union

v.

Kern County Land Co.,

150 Cal. 466 [89 P.

120]; McFarland

v.

Martin,

144 Cal. 771 [78 P. 239]).

It appears from the complaint that the defendants were the owners of certain described real property in Riverside County; that with intent to deceive and defraud plaintiffs and to induce them to purchase the property, the defendants knowingly made certain representations concerning the property which were relied on by the plaintiffs; that defendants knew that plaintiffs relied on the representations; that the representations were false and untrue in the particulars set forth; that at the time the representations were made, and at the time of the purchase, plaintiffs did not know of the falsity of the representations; that in reliance on those representations, plaintiffs were induced to purchase the real property, together with certain tools and equipment, for the sum of $55,000 for the realty and $1,000 for the personalty, and that plaintiffs would not have purchased except for the representations made; that on the purchase price $17,500 was paid in cash, and the balance was represented by a promissory note in the amount of $38,500 secured by a deed of trust wherein defendants Brisson were the beneficiaries and defendant trust company was trustee, and by a chattel mortgage as additional security wherein defendants Brisson were the mortgagees; that plaintiffs received a deed to the real prop