Homeland Building Co. v. Reynolds

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BARNARD, P. J.

This is an action for declaratory relief and to set aside an alleged fraudulent transfer of real property from Glenn Q. Reynolds to his wife Esther Reynolds. The plaintiff sought to have it declared that a judgment it held against Glenn Q. Reynolds was a valid lien against the property and unaffected by a homestead declaration filed by the wife.

The defendants were married in 1919 and had three children. On March 4, 1935, Mrs. Reynolds bought the property in question, which consisted of some lots with an unfinished house thereon, agreeing to pay about $1,000 therefor. At that time she paid $100 down and received some sort of receipt agreement. On March 13,1936, she entered into a more formal agreement with the owner of the property, which agreement was also signed by her husband. This agreement provided that $450 should be paid from money expected to be received from a veteran’s bonus payment due to Reynolds and some $500 out of a loan of $1,880 being made by a savings and loan association.

In December, 1936, through an escrow, this savings and loan association increased its loan to $2,500 and the balance due was paid to the owner of the property who conveyed it to Mrs. Reynolds by a deed which was recorded December 26, 1936. Under the arrangement, the remainder of the loan was used in completing the house on the property. On March 9, 1937, Mrs. Reynolds recorded a declaration of homestead. In the meantime and on June 24, 1936, the plaintiff herein recovered a judgment for $428.15 against Mr. Reynolds, an abstract of which judgment was recorded on June 26, 1936. The record fails to show when this obligation was incurred.

The court found in all respects in favor of the defendants finding, among other things, that at the time the abstract of the judgment was recorded Glenn Q. Reynolds was not the equitable owner of this property; that Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds did not procure a conveyance in the name of Mrs. Reynolds without any consideration paid by her and did not procure such conveyance for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of Mr. Reynolds and in particular this plaintiff; that the property was not the community property of the defendants; that it was the separate property of Mrs. Reynolds; that Mrs.

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