LeGrand v. Russell

STEPHENS (JESS E.), J. pro tem.

This is an appeal by third party claimant from a judgment of the trial court based upon findings that a certain automobile was the property of defendant C. T. Kennedy and not of appellant.

It appears from the record that appellant was employed by Kennedy, a building contractor engaged in constructing a number of dwelling houses, and that on October 12, 1940, appellant purchased the automobile in question (a small, used Ford truck) from Kennedy for the sum of $150, paying $30 cash and the balance in installments which were completed December 2, 1940. On the latter date appellant received the “pink slip,” endorsed by Kennedy, and mailed it to the Department of Motor Vehicles with the accompanying fees and requested that a new one be issued in his name. This new pink slip was issued by the department on December 13, 1940. On December 12, 1940, the sheriff levied upon and took possession of the automobile pursuant to a writ of execution issued upon a long-standing judgment against defendant Kennedy.

Respondents rely upon section 186 of the Vehicle Code and the case of

Coca Cola Bottling Co.

v. Feliciano, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 351 [89 P. (2d) 686], Section 186 of the Vehicle Code at the time in question read as follows: “No transfer of the title or any interest in or to a vehicle registered hereunder shall pass nor shall delivery of any said vehicle be deemed to have been made and any attempted transfer shall not be effective for any purpose until transfer of registration is made and the department has issued a new certificate of ownership and registration card with respect thereto as provided herein, except as a transferor may be estopped by law to deny a transfer and except as provided in sections 178 and 180 hereof and in chapter 3 of this division. ’ ’

It is clear that inasmuch as Kennedy, the transferor, had received the full amount of the purchase price and had delivered the pink slip to the buyer prior to the levy, he was estopped, as against the buyer, to deny the transfer. He therefore comes within the exception provided in the above section of the code. The judgment creditor takes no better title than his judgment debtor, and is likewise estopped.

[281]

(Carpenter