Cramer v. County of Los Angeles

MOORE, P. J.

J.—The question for decision is whether the action of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County in vacating a public road was so arbitrary as to constitute fraud. Having granted judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action, the judgment of dismissal was entered.

The substance of the complaint is that “Sheriff Road” is á duly dedicated road; it entered plaintiffs’ property and was a means of access thereto and has been regularly used by plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest and by the owners of adjacent properties; on July 10, 1941, the board by resolu

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tion duly adopted made an order setting aside Sheriff Road for county highway and right-of-way purposes; April 1, 1944, defendant cut off a portion of the easterly terminus of Sheriff Road thereby excluding access to plaintiffs’ property; April 1, 1946, the sheriff without legal right caused to be erected a fence across Sheriff Road effectively excluding and eliminating plaintiffs’ means of access to their property; November 12, 1946, by resolution adopted at a legal session the board “ordered a portion of said Sheriff Road vacated and abandoned as unnecessary for future or present public use”; such action of the board cut off access to plaintiffs’ property and it has ever since been and still is inaccessible from Sheriff Road which was necessary for present and future public use; “the act of the board was without right or authority, contrary to law and constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power of "said board and was an abuse of its discretion”; plaintiffs’ property had a rental value of $1,000 per month; such value was destroyed by the act of defendants to plaintiffs ’ damage in that amount from April 1, 1944; January 6, 1948, plaintiffs filed their claims for damages against the county with the board; April 13, 1948, the board rejected such claim.

The complaint was filed June 3, 1948.

Contrary to appellants’ contention, the resolution of the board was a valid act. Such an act is legislative in character and “is conclusive both as to the necessity or convenience of the improvement and as to the extent of the district to be benefited.”

(Beals