Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission

GIBSON, C. J.

These are proceedings to review orders of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation for injuries sustained by employees in an automobile accident which occurred while they were returning home from work.

Bjerke, Padilla and Ruble lived in Pomona and were employed by petitioner Kobe on a roofing job in San Bernardino. It was agreed that the men would work nine hours per day and would receive an additional hour’s pay to compensate them for the time spent in traveling to and from work. Kobe was a party to a union contract which obligated him to pay travel time to employees who traveled back and forth each day to jobs over 15 miles distant from the employer’s place of business, and it was common practice in the business to pay one hour’s extra pay in lieu of travel time. The employees involved in these proceedings traveled to and from the job in San Bernardino in an automobile owned and driven by Bjerke, the trip ordinarily taking about thirty-five minutes. On the day of the accident, they left their place of work at 4:30 p. m. and 10 to 15 minutes later, after they had proceeded about 5 miles on the shortest route to Pomona, the automobile in which they were riding was struck by a locomotive. Bjerke and Padilla were seriously injured and Ruble subsequently died from the effects of the injuries he received.

The question before us is whether the evidence supports the

[35]

commission’s findings and conclusion that the injuries arose out of and in the course of the employment.

It is the general rule that injuries sustained by an employee going to or returning from work are not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The rule is premised on the theory that ordinarily the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his work to go home until he resumes his work.

(California Cas. Indem. Exch.

v.

Industrial Acc. Com.,

21 Cal.2d 751, 754 [135 P.2d 158].) However, the employer may agree, either expressly or impliedly, that the relationship shall continue during the period of “going and coming,” in which ease the employee is entitled to the protection of the act during that period. Such an agreement may be inferred from the fact that the employer furnishes transportation to and from work as an incident of the employment.