Shade v. Board of Trustees

CRAIL, P. J.

—This is an appeal from a judgment denying plaintiff a writ of mandate to compel his reinstatement as a permanent teacher of the defendant school district.

Plaintiff was employed as a teacher, with a permanent status, by the defendant school district. On April 3, 1936, he tendered his written resignation to the president of the board of trustees of the defendant school district; said resignation being in the following language: “As per our recent conversation, I hereby tender you my resignation as a member of the faculty of R. U. H. S., effective June 12,

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1936,” followed by plaintiff’s signature. On May 11, 1936, the board of trustees, at a regular meeting, accepted said resignation and fixed the effective date thereof as June 12, 1936. On May 12, 1936, plaintiff sent to each member of the board of trustees a letter, in which he rescinded and withdrew said purported resignation and requested the board to rescind its purported acceptance of his resignation. The board of trustees took no action on this request and, at all times subsequent to June 12, 1936, has refused to employ plaintiff as a teacher of the defendant school district.

The contention is made by plaintiff that the resignation was a nullity because it was addressed to the president of the board of trustees rather than to the board of trustees,— in other words, that the resignation was not tendered to the board of trustees, but was tendered to the president of the board as a private individual only. While it is true that the tender of a resignation to any other than the authority competent to accept it is nullity

(State

v.

Boecker,

56 Mo. 17), we feel that, in the instant case, the tender was properly made. The letter of resignation was addressed as follows : “Mr. J. IT. Gregory, Pres. R. U. H. S. Board of Trustees.” In

State

v.

Board of Education,

23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 98, under facts almost identical with those of the present case, the court held that although the resignation was addressed to the president of the board of education, acceptance by the board was valid. It appeared in that case, however, that the person who was resigning had consented to the presentation of the resignation to the board by the president. In the instant case there is substantial evidence that it was plaintiff’s intention that said resignation be presented to the board of trustees. We therefore feel that the resignation was not a nullity and that it was duly accepted by the board prior to plaintiff’s attempted withdrawal.