Collins v. Hodgson

PULLEN, P. J.

This action was brought against defendants for injuries sustained in a collision between two automobiles. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants and a judgment was entered accordingly. Thereafter upon a motion for a new tial, the same was granted upon grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. It is from these orders granting a new trial that defendants appeal.

On the morning of the accident plaintiffs herein, Mr. and Mrs. Collins and Dr. and Mrs. Simonton were proceeding westerly along the state highway in the county of Yolo, in the automobile of Mr. Collins, which was being operated by Dr. Simonton. For some distance plaintiffs had been traveling about fifty feet in the rear of a car owned by defendant I. D. Hodgson and driven by defendant C. E. Hodgson. When the cars had reached a point approximately two miles west of Sacramento, defendant stopped, and the car of plaintiff struck the rear left corner of defendants’ ear causing plaintiffs’ ear to swerve across the highway to the left, and after traveling approximately 65 feet struck a tree at the side of the road, causing the injuries of which complaint is here made.

It is the contention of plaintiffs that defendant stopped suddenly in the middle of the right side of the road, which

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at that point was a two-lane highway, so indicated by a white line down the center. Plaintiffs were traveling about 50 feet behind defendant and saw no signal of defendant’s intention to stop and it was not testified by defendant that he gave any signal that he was intending to stop or change his course. Plaintiffs admitted that they saw defendants’ car begin to slacken speed when they were approximately 50 feet away. Defendant claims he was in the act of driving off the highway and had not stopped when struck- by plaintiffs. A traffic officer testified, that according to measurements of the tracks taken by him, the collision occurred 18 inches from the right or north edge of the highway:

As to the granting of a new trial it is said:

“That the granting of a new trial is a thing resting so largely in the discretion of the trial court that its action in that regard will not be disturbed except upon the disclosure of a manifest and unmistakable abuse, has become axiomatic, and requires no citation of authority in its support. It is true- that such discretion is not a right to the exertion of a mere personal or arbitrary will of the judge, but is a power governed by fixed rules of law, and to be reasonable, exercised within those rules, to the accomplishment of justice. But so long as a case made presents an instance showing a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will not be here set aside, even if, as a question of first impression, we might feel inclined to take a different view from that of the court below as to the propriety of its action.”