Ceikin v. Goldman

ROTH, J.,

pro tem.

This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment rendered in favor of two minor plaintiffs, who were riding as guests in an automobile of defendants, and from an order denying motion for a new trial. . The only question presented is whether or not the evidence is sufficient

to

sustain the findings of the court which substantially and impliedly recite that the defendants were guilty of misconduct within the meaning of section 141¾ of the California Vehicle Act, as amended in 1931.

The evidence discloses that in loading a two-door Chevrolet coach, with five-passenger capacity, Mrs. Goldman, her

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year and a half old baby, her husband’s twelve year old nephew and Eunice Ceikin, one of the injured minors, arranged themselves in the back seat. Joe Goldman sat in the driver’s seat. Mrs. Ceikin, the mother of the injured minors, requested her daughter Ducia, the other injured minor, also to get into the back seat, but Ducia had already taken her place beside Mr. Goldman and Mrs. Goldman insisted that Ducia sit in the front seat so that the baby could lie down and go to sleep. Mrs. Ceikin then got into the right front seat, which would place her immediately contiguous and to the right of the child Ducia. Joe Goldman testified that the child Ducia “started to sit on half of my seat . . . and I was afraid it would interfere with the shifting of my gears, so I told her to sit on her mother’s lap”. He did not remember whether Mrs. Ceikin said anything to this suggestion, but Mrs. Ceikin testified that she told him “it would block his view, if I held her in that position . . . and he said that is perfectly all right, let her sit there’.” Goldman testified directly that sitting on her mother’s lap the child Ducia did obstruct his vision to the right and he did notice it at the time the party started. As they proceeded a few blocks and approached the intersection of Seventh Avenue and Montclair Street in the city of Los Angeles, Goldman testified he was proceeding at about 25 miles per hour. Mrs. Ceikin said 30. He proceeded across the intersection at that speed and did not see the ear coming from the right. When approximately in the center of the intersection, the Chevrolet car was struck on its right side midway between the cowl and the right door by a ear coming from the east. The record reveals, further, that the speed at the intersection in question was limited by law to 15 miles per hour, and that Mrs. Ceikin told Mr. Goldman before he entered the intersection, that he was going too fast, although Goldman testified he did not remember such admonition.