City of Pasadena v. Fox

SHINN, J., pro tem.

The judgment appealed from directed appellant, as Chief Engineer of the Department of Building of the County of Los Angeles, to issue to the City of Pasadena, without payment of any fee for the service, a permit to make alterations and repairs upon a reservoir of the City of Pasadena situated in unincorporated territory.

[585]

The entire controversy arises out of the claim by the county that the city was not entitled to receive a permit without the payment of a fee therefor.

By the terms of an ordinance of the county a fee is charged for the service, of checking plans and issuing building permits, no exception being made in the case of a municipality applying for the. service. The county was entitled to collect the fee unless the exception declared in section 4295 of the Political Code is applicable. The section provides in part as follows: “State, county and township officers shall not, in any case, except in proceedings upon

habeas corpus,

perform any official services unless upon the payment of such fees as are prescribed by law, for the performance of such services; provided, that except where otherwise specifically provided the state or any county, city, city and county, district, or other political subdivision, or any public officer, or board or body, acting in his or its official capacity on behalf of the state, or any county, city, city and county, district, or other political subdivision, shall not be required to pay or deposit any fee for the filing of any document or paper, or for the performance of any official service. ’ ’

It is insisted by appellant, whose interests are solely those of the county, that the general law has no application because the situation is one in which a county ordinance will prevail over the general law; and that even though it be conceded that the general law would prevail over the county ordinance where the two are in conflict, yet there is no conflict because the state has not legislated specifically in the matter of the issuance of building permits by counties. It is further insisted that inasmuch as the ordinance does not exempt municipalities from the payment of fees, the exemption declared by the general law does not apply because it has been “otherwise specifically provided” within the meaning of section 4295, and that therefore the terms of the ordinance bring the case within this exception stated in the code section. The position of the county cannot be sustained.