WHITE, P. J. In an information filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County containing five counts, defendant was accused in Count I of the crime of forging a fictitious name (Pen. Code, § 470). The remaining four counts charged separate offenses of issuing a cheek without sufficient funds (Pen. Code, § 476a).
In Count I, it was charged that defendant wilfully and with intent to defraud John Shrayer and Bank of America, South Whittier Branch, made, passed, uttered and published a fictitious check in the sum of $2,172 on or about April 26, 1957, knowing the check to be fictitious.
In Count II, it was alleged that defendant wilfully and [495]with intent to defraud Esther Jessup, Thriftimart, and Bank of America, South Whittier Branch, made, drew, uttered and delivered a check in the sum of $50 on or about April 28, 1957, knowing that he had neither funds in nor sufficient credit with the drawee bank to meet the check.
In Count III, it was charged that defendant had committed the same offense on or about May 2,1957, by making, drawing, uttering and delivering a check in the sum of $50 with intent to defraud Frieda Edgerton, Thriftimart and Bank of America, South Whittier Branch.
In Count IV, it was alleged that defendant had committed the same offense on or about May 6, 1957, by making, drawing, uttering, and delivering a check in the sum of $75 with intent to defraud Joe Brown, Market Basket and Bank of America, South Whittier Branch.
In Count Y, it was charged that defendant had committed the same offense on or about May 26, 1957, by making; drawing, uttering, and delivering a cheek in the sum of $50 with intent to defraud Lois Dafoe, Nixon’s Market and Bank of America, South Whittier Branch.
The information also charged three prior felony convictions, two for forgery and one for issuing checks without sufficient funds.
Defendant entered pleas of not guilty as to each count of the information and denied the alleged prior convictions. Trial by jury was duly waived and by stipulation the cause was submitted to the court on the testimony adduced at the preliminary examination, each side reserving the right to offer additional evidence. Defendant did not testify or offer any evidence in his behalf.
Defendant was found guilty on all counts of the information, no finding was made as to the alleged prior convictions, his motion for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to state prison. From the judgment of conviction, defendant prosecutes this appeal.
As to the factual background of this prosecution, the record reveals that defendant maintained an account in Bank of America, South Whittier Branch, under the name of Jay Reed Enterprises. On April 26, 1957, he presented a check in the sum of $2,172 for deposit to his account to John Shrayer, an employee of the Bank of America, South Whittier Branch. The check was drawn on the Bank of America, Fresno Main Office, and was dated April 24, 1957. The payee was Jay Reed Enterprises and the signature of the drawer [496]was “E. G. Griffiths.” The cheek was credited to defendant’s account and he subsequently drew four checks against the account: a check for $50 on April 28; a check for $50 on Hay 2; a check for $75 on May 5; and a check for $50 on May 26. These checks were honored on the dates they bore and were received by the persons named in the information, each of whom gave to defendant the money received for said checks. If the aforesaid check for $2,172, signed “E. G. Griffiths,” had been dishonored on the date it was presented, there would not have been funds in defendant’s account to meet the subsequent checks.
The check signed “E. G. Griffiths” was dishonored by the Bank of America, Fresno Main Office. There was no account in the name of 11E. G. Griffiths” in that bank, nor was there any record concerning such a person. The Fresno bank Main Office had no arrangements for credit with any “E. G. Griffiths” or with the defendant, and the South Whittier Branch had no arrangements for credit to defendant or to Jay Reed Enterprises.
It was stipulated that John Harris, an examiner of questioned documents, “is an expert in the comparison and identification of handwriting. ’ ’ He testified that in his opinion the signature “E. G. Griffiths” appearing on the face of the check for $2,172 (People’s Exhibit 1) and the handwriting specimens supplied by defendant were written by the same hand.
Appellant’s sole contention on this appeal is that although the witness Harris was called as an expert on handwriting and his qualifications as an expert in the field of comparison and identification of handwriting were stipulated nevertheless, the witness “presented his evidence strictly as a layman” because, says appellant, “There is no evidence of an expert’s method of comparison or identification of People’s Exhibit 1, the signature ‘E G. Griffiths’ on the $2172.00 check and People’s Exhibit 6, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department form, the handwriting ‘John Elton Bullock’ ” (defendant). As to the method utilized by Mr. Harris in arriving at his opinion the record reflects the following:
“Q. (By Mr. Umann, coxmsel for appellant): What type of examination did you make, a visual? A. Well, just normal visual examination.
“Q. Anything more than that? A. No, I made no photographs of it or didn’t examine it under a microscope.
“Q. Are there any other types of tests that you could have made? A. Not that would be necessary in this ease.
[497]“Q. Now, the visual tests were made without the aid of any magnifying glass or microscope; is that correct? A. That’s right. ’ ’
“Q. You did base your opinion on certain factors that you observed; is that right? A. Well, yes, the characteristics of the handwriting.
“Q. Now, did you find any similarities upon which to base this opinion? A. Well, I certainly did or I wouldn’t have reached a conclusion that they were both the same handwriting. ’ ’
It is appellant’s contention in effect that a handwriting expert who bases his opinion solely on a visual examination testifies as a layman and the admissibility of his testimony is governed by the provisions of section 1943 of the Code of Civil Procedure—that is, he must have seen the subject write or have seen writing purporting to be his, upon which he has acted or been charged, and has thereby acquired a knowledge of the subject’s writing. Appellant cites no authority for this proposition and we are satisfied it is without merit. When, as in the instant case, it was stipulated that the witness Harris, by reason of his education, study and experience was qualified as an expert in the art of handwriting, his testimony respecting the handwriting of appellant was admissible (People v. DeMordaigle, 138 Cal.App.2d 435, 440 [292 P.2d 3]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1944; Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 9; 19 Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 352, 354). We are satisfied the testimony of Mr. Harris, based as it was on his experience, knowledge and skill in a field in which his competency was stipulated, was clearly admissible. While the particular method adopted by him might go to the weight of his testimony, it clearly does not warrant its rejection. The weight and effect of the opinion of the expert witness, or the results of comparisons of the handwritings, was a matter for the duly constituted arbiter of the facts.
Furthermore, since no timely objection to the introduction of this evidence was made in trial court, the objection thereto, on this appeal, comes too late (People v. Millum, 42 Cal.2d 524, 528 [267 P.2d 1039]).
Appellant relies upon the cases of People v. Simon, 107 Cal.App.2d 105, 120, 12.1 [236 P.2d 855], and People v. Zoffel, 35 Cal.App.2d 215, 221 [95 P.2d 160], but in these cases, the court was not concerned with testimony given by an expert [498]witness. People v. Simon, supra, simply holds that under section 1943 of the Code of Civil Procedure a nonexpert or lay witness may testify as to the identity of handwriting of the purported writer where a proper foundation has been laid showing the knowledge required by the aforesaid section of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the Zoifel case, supra, it is held that certain cards bearing the name of the accused were inadmissible because the defendant “. . . was not present when the cards were found, was not proved to have been in the apartment, and no evidence was offered that they were in her handwriting.” (Emphasis added.) Both cases involve questions and issues not present in the case at bar.
The judgment is affirmed.
Lillie, J., concurred.