Sitzman v. City Board of Education

GIBSON, C. J.

Petitioner, a probationary teacher of the Eureka High School District, was notified on May 8, 1962, that his services would not be required for the ensuing school

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year. He gave timely notice of Ms defense and requested a hearing, which was held on September 4, 1962. The board decided that petitioner would not be reemployed, and on December 28, 1962, he filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the board to reinstate him as a probationary teacher. An alternative writ of mandate was issued, and the school board filed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the court without leave to amend. Petitioner has appealed from the judgment denying the writ.

Petitioner’s sole contention is that he was entitled to a hearing before May 15, 1962, and that he was automatically reemployed as a probationary teacher for the ensuing school year by reason of the failure of the board to hold a hearing before that date. The board, on the other hand, contends that at the time petitioner was employed for the school year beginning July 1, 1961, a probationary teacher could be dismissed at the end of the school year without a hearing and that the 1961 amendment to section 13444 of the Education Code, which became effective after the commencement of the 1961-62 school year, does not apply to petitioner’s dismissal. The board also contends that, even if petitioner were entitled to a hearing pursuant to the statute as amended in 1961, the law did not require that the hearing be held prior to May 15, 1962.

We shall first consider the board’s contention that the 1961 amendment to section 13444 is not applicable to petitioner’s dismissal. The board reasons that the statute, as amended, granted probationary teachers a “limited sort of tenure” which did not exist when petitioner and the board entered into their contract of employment and that to make the statute applicable to the dismissal of petitioner would be a retroactive application which is presumed not to be intended by the Legislature.

A statute does not operate retroactively merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came into existence prior to its enactment.

(Burks