Scoville v. Keglor

MARKS, J.

On June 6, 1938, this court decided the ap'peal in this cause. (27 Cal. App. (2d) 17 [80 Pac. (2d) 162].) Our order, then made, was as follows:

[67]

“The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to that court to make findings of fact in accordance with the evidence already taken and the views herein expressed, including a specification with proper particularity of all items of damage allowed, and to file such findings together with judgment thereon

nunc pro tunc

as of December 1, 1936.”

A petition for hearing in the Supreme Court was denied and the judgment became final.

Remittitur

was issued on August 8, 1938.

On September 8, 1938, appellants filed a notice of motion to strike from our order the following portions:

(1) “And the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to that court to make findings of fact in accordance with the evidence already taken and the views herein expressed, including a specification with proper particularity of all items of damage allowed.

(2) “And to file such findings together with judgment thereon

nunc pro tunc

as of December 1, 1936.”

A District Court of Appeal retains jurisdiction of a cause for thirty days after its judgment is pronounced. (Sec. 4c, art. VI, Const.;

Estate of Carroll,

190 Cal. 105 [210 Pac. 817].) Its

remittitur

should be issued sixty days after judgment. (Rule XXXIV, Rules for the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal.) It would follow that, ordinarily, a District Court of Appeal would possess no power to modify its judgment after thirty days following its pronouncement.