Mayer v. Hazzard

WOOD, J.

By a written lease defendants Hazzard leased to plaintiff for a term of one year from January 15, 1933, the rear 50 feet of the premises located at 126 Magnolia Avenue, Long Beach, said premises having a total depth of 206 feet and a width of 50 feet. The lessors maintained a storeroom in the front part of the premises and plaintiff maintained an automobile repair shop in the space covered by the lease. Subject to plaintiff’s lease, the Hazzards leased the entire premises to defendant Neet, appellant herein, on May 6, 1933. The action is for damages for the interference by appellant with plaintiff’s use of the leased property. The ease was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff, and from the judgment entered thereon defendant Neet appeals.

[3]

Appellant’s contention that the complaint does not state a cause of action cannot be upheld. It is set forth in the complaint that the lessors promised that plaintiff should have access to the rear 50 feet of the storeroom through a door opening on Magnolia Avenue and through and across the front 156 feet of the storeroom to the portion leased by plaintiff; that plaintiff took possession of the leased property, maintained an office at the Magnolia Avenue entrance, received customers through said entrance and secured business from owners of automobiles stored and parked in the front portion of the storeroom. It is further set forth that defendant Neet received a lease from defendants Hazzard subject to plaintiff’s lease covering the rear portion, with full knowledge of the conditions of said lease and of plaintiff’s use of the property by having means of ingress and egress for customers through the front portion of the premises, and that defendant Neet promised to comply with all of the terms and conditions of the lease. Appropriate allegations are made of the fact that defendant Neet closed the Magnolia Avenue entrance and erected a partition between the portion of the premises leased by plaintiff and the front part of the storeroom, thereby forcing plaintiff to use an alleyway for his business, together with allegations covering the damages sustained. Appellant argues that plaintiff should have set forth in his complaint that the entrance through the Magnolia Avenue frontage was reasonably necessary to the use of the property covered by the lease. Such an allegation was not necessary. Rights of ingress and egress by the usual way pass to the tenant, although not specifically mentioned in the lease, or the word “appurtenances” be not used, under the general rule that, those rights essential to the use of the demised premises pass as appurtenant thereto. A tenant is entitled to the maintenance of an entrance which is necessary to the full enjoyment of his use of the property, although it may not be the only means of access. (36 Cor. Jur. 33.) •