McLane v. Storr

California Court of Appeal Jul 22, 1946 No. Civ. 15178Published

Before: Wood

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Holding. The court held that an assignee of a cause of action may be substituted as plaintiff even after the commencement of the action, and that the defendant failed to meet the burden of proving he was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the assignment.

Issues

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the substitution of an assignee as plaintiff after the commencement of the action.
Whether the defendant established the status of a bona fide purchaser regarding quitclaim deeds obtained after the assignment of the contract.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the existence and content of a lost written assignment.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Section 385 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that in such cases the assignee may be substituted as the party to whose interest he has succeeded, or that the action may be continued in the name of the original party.”

“The burden was upon appellant to establish his status of bona fide purchaser without notice of the reassignment to Mattox.”

“The decision on the former appeal that specific performance is a proper remedy herein is the law of the case.”

WOOD, J.

Action for specific performance. Defendant Storr appeals from the judgment that John W. Mattox, the assignee of plaintiffs, should be substituted as plaintiff, and that defendants should convey the property to him.

Under a written contract, dated June 15,1938, and recorded August 11, 1938, defendant Mrs. Van Eaton agreed to sell to John W. Mattox, and he agreed to buy from her, certain real-property for the sum of $318, payable in installments of $10 per month. Under a written assignment, dated May 15, 1939,

[461]

and recorded on that day, Mattox assigned his interest in said contract to plaintiffs McLane. On March 15, 1941, when the balance due under the contract was $20.23, plaintiffs wrote a letter to Mrs. Van Baton stating that they desired to pay the balance due and obtain a deed to the property. She replied on March 19th stating that she could not comply with the request because the property was under attachment in a law suit, by a finance company, against Mattox, and further that she had sold her claim against him several months previously. On November 14, 1941, she sold and conveyed the property to defendant Storr for $425.

In a prior trial, the judgment of the trial court was that specific performance should be denied, and that plaintiffs should recover $384 (the reasonable value of the property) from defendant Van Baton. On appeal that judgment was reversed

(McLane

Van Eaton,

60 Cal.App.2d 612 [141 P.2d 783]), the court holding that specific performance was a proper remedy, that Storr had constructive notice of the contract between Mrs. Van Baton and Mattox, and that he took the property subject to the rights of Mattox and his assignees, the plaintiffs McLane.

Upon the retrial on December 4, 1944, the evidence was apparently the same in substance as it had been in the former trial, except there was evidence on the retrial: (1) That, after the reversal of the former judgment, each of the plaintiffs McLane had made, executed and delivered to defendant Storr a quitclaim deed whereby each plaintiff quitclaimed all his or her right, title and interest in said property to defendant Storr for a total consideration to both of $25; (2) that plaintiffs McLane, after the quitclaim deeds were executed, gave written instructions to their attorney to dismiss this action ; (3) that on March 27, 1942, Mattox paid to the McLanes all the money they had put into .the property, and they agreed to assign this cause of action and the contract to Mattox (which was after the complaint was filed on December 11, 1941, and before the first trial was had on September 3,1942), that on March 11, 1943, they executed a written assignment transferring and assigning all their interest in the action and contract to Mattox, and that said written assignment had been lost.

McLane v. Storr

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WOOD, J.

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