Steele v. Steele

DORAN, J.

This is an appeal by a husband from a judgment of divorce which declares that a half interest in certain real property held under a joint tenancy deed was community property, and that the other half interest was the separate property of the wife. The trial court awarded this property to the wife who was ordered to pay to the husband $10,000 in installments of $100 per month. The husband was not required to pay any sums for the support of the wife or the three children. The parties were married on December 18, 1924, and separated on September 5, 1951.

Much of appellant’s argument relates to the form of deed • under which title to the real property was held. In effect appellant argues that since the record title was held in joint tenancy, this fact would prevent the trial court from holding otherwise or making the award in question in favor of the wife. There is no merit to this contention. Aside from the fact of the parties’ stipulation hereinafter to be discussed, it has long been established that the mere form of a deed does not necessarily determine the real nature of the transaction. This is particularly true in reference to property owned by husband and wife.

The rule is stated in the late case of

Veronin

v.

Veronin,

131 Cal.App.2d 298, 299 [280 P.2d 173] (March 4, 1955), as follows: “While a deed to spouses as joint ten

[303]

ants raises a presumption that they intended title to be so vested, it is now thoroughly settled that parol evidence is admissible to show that they had a mutual intention that the property should in fact be acquired and held as a community asset.” Plaintiff here testified as to the acquisition of the property that “It was from the earnings of both of us and derivatives from the rents of previously owned properties,” and such appears to have been the fact. As said in the Veronin case just cited, “A determination by a trial court that the presumption has been rebutted is conclusive on a reviewing court unless it is manifestly without support in the evidence.”

At the opening of the trial a stipulation was entered into in open court, “that an undivided one-half is the plaintiff’s separate property; that as to the remaining undivided one-half the Court can determine the status of that.” To this stipulation the respective parties as well as the attorneys, expressed their agreement aftér the trial court had repeated the definite terms thereof.