Poore v. Edgar Bros. Co.
Before: Barnard
BARNARD, P. J.
This is an action for damages for personal injuries. The appeal is from a judgment of dismissal "following the sustaining of a demurrer to a second amended complaint. The sole question presented is whether this complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
On January 29, 1937, one Dan Poore purchased from the respondent a second-hand 1936 Ford automobile. On February 5, 1937, while riding in this car, the appellant was injured by broken glass from the right front door thereof, the glass being broken in a collision between that car and another automobile. At that time section 675.5 of the Vehicle Code required safety glass on any new motor vehicle sold after January 1, 1936, but there was no su-ch provision in connection with the sale of a second-hand ear.
The gist of the complaint is that shatter-proof glass was the standard and advertised equipment of 1936 Ford cars; that the respondent was guilty of negligence in that it had knowingly replaced the glass in the right front door of this ear with
[8]
an inferior grade of glass; that without fault of the appellant the glass in this door wTas brokén by a blow which would not have broken shatter-proof glass; and that such negligence on the part of the respondent was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the appellant.
The appellant relies upon the principles laid down in
MacPherson
v.
Buick Motor Co.,
217 N. Y. 382 [111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 440, L. R. A. 1916F, 696], and approved in
Kalash
v.
Los Angeles Ladder Co.,
1 Cal. (2d) 229 [34 Pac. (2d) 481], to the general effect that the manufacturer of an article, knowing that it is to be used by others than the immediate purchaser, is liable to such others for injury which is directly traceable to negligence on the part of the manufacturer, if the nature of the article is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made and, further, that when a manufacturer or vendor sells an article which because of known structural weaknesses will be inherently dangerous to those using it for the purpose for which it was manufactured or sold, such defects and such purpose being known, the manufacturer or vendor will be held liable to respond in damages to one who is injured while using the article for that purpose, in the absence of contributory negligence or other valid defense.
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)