BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I write separately to express my views on the use by the police of a weapon of war in the neighborhoods of our citizens.
The facts warrant in-depth review because they highlight just how dangerous and unnecessary use of the “motorized battering ram” is in executing search or arrest warrants, even where the police confront specially fortified residences. They provide the basis for understanding why other police departments spurn its use, likening it to the use of an Uzi to shoot an illegally parked driver in the leg so he will be unable to escape getting a ticket. (Klein, Rock Houses: Police Ram Opens Door to Debate, L.A. Times (June 4, 1985) Home Ed., Metro Section, at p. 1.)
Turning to the record, there is basic agreement as to the following:
(1) The “motorized battering ram” is actually a military vehicle—a V-100 armored personnel carrier or tank—that has been specially equipped with a 14-foot horizontal steel battering ram capped with a rectangular steel plate.1
(2) When used to gain entry to a house, the V-100 is driven at approximately five miles per hour toward an exterior wall. The ram is attached to the front of the vehicle. Once it hits and punches through the wall, the driver puts the vehicle in reverse and, as the ram is being withdrawn, the [34]driver rakes it back and forth to create a hole approximately five feet in diameter through which the police may enter without having to crawl. These maneuvers take approximately six seconds.
(3) The department’s usual but not invariable practice is to announce over a public address system that the LAPD is present to serve a search warrant immediately prior to using the V-100 to gain entry to a house. Insofar as the record reveals, however, the police do not ordinarily wait even a few seconds to determine whether the occupants of the house are willing to permit entry.
(4) The V-100 causes substantial damage to the target house. The force of impact is such as to cause wall studs at the area of impact to be displaced and thrown forcefully into the interior of the house. In addition, the V-100 causes significant damage to walls and ceilings located at some distance from the point of impact.
(5) The parties dispute the level of risk posed by use of the V-100 to the overall integrity of the target house and to the surrounding neighborhood. All agree, however, that there is a potential danger of structural collapse and/or rupture of electrical and gas utility lines and that a serious fire or explosion which could threaten the safety not only of the occupants of the target house but also of the surrounding neighborhood could result. In addition, the police have no way of knowing in advance whether individuals are standing or sitting directly in front of the V-100’s intended point of impact and so might be struck by the ram itself or injured by falling wall studs, flying bits of masonry, or broken glass from nearby windows.
(6) At the time of the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the LAPD had used the V-100 four times in executing search warrants.”2The first time was on February 6, 1985, against the Langford’s rented home at 13037 Louvre Street. The LAPD concedes that this home was “fortified” in exactly the same manner as the house at 13031 Louvre Street, which the police were able successfully to enter and search—without use of the V-100—in June of 1984, before the occupants could destroy the cocaine in their posses[35]sion. The LAPD further concedes that the decision to request use of the V-100 against 13037 Louvre Street was based solely on the visible fortifications and on the fact that the house was owned by one Jeff Bryant.3 The police had no evidence that there were any weapons at 13037 Louvre Street.4
(7) The V-100 was next used on February 13, 1985, against an even more “fortified” house located at 233 West 111th Street. The police again concede that they were able successfully to enter and search this very same building—without use of the V-100—in September of 1984. They further concede that the decision to request use of the V-100 on February 13th was based solely on the fact that the house was fortified and that, during the previous search, they had recovered two weapons.
(8) The third use of the V-100 occurred on March 22, 1985, against a house located at 11442 Wheeler Avenue. The police concede, yet again, that they were able successfully to enter and search this same house—without use of the V-100—two months earlier, before the occupants were able to destroy the cocaine in their possession. Moreover, although a weapon was recovered in the earlier raid, there is no indication in the record that any attempt was made by the then current occupants to use it against the officers who executed the warrant. Finally, the only visible change in the fortifications during the two-month interval between the first and second searches was the addition of a chain link fence around the front of the house.
(9) The fourth use of the V-100 took place on April 26, 1985, against a “rock house” located on the ground floor of a brick building located at 4066 South Central Avenue. Insofar as the record reveals, the police had not previously served a search warrant at this location. Before entering the premises on April 26th, they were aware of the full extent of the interior fortifications, which were substantial. They had also been told that a shooting had occurred in the house the week previous, knew that both the operator and two guards were present, and knew that at least the operator and possibly the guards were armed or had weapons nearby.
[36](10) Although there is no direct evidence that use of the ram on this last occasion was wholly unnecessary, there is substantial circumstantial evidence which compels such conclusion. For example, during the four-month period from October 1984 to February 1985, members of the LAPD were able to enter and search 269 “rock houses” in which a total of 207 guns were seized—without use of the V-100 and apparently without injury to a single officer or the loss of a gram of evidence. Similarly, during the 3-day period from May 30 through June 1, 1985, LAPD officers entered and searched 13 (or 14) “rock houses” without resorting to use of the V-100 and without suffering injury, seizing approximately 10 weapons and 1000 grams of cocaine.5
(11) No one was physically injured during the four occasions on which the V-100 was used, although the three children present in the Langford’s house when it was rammed were so terrified by the experience that they were still having nightmares about it at the time of the hearing on the preliminary injunction, i.e., some four months later.
I.
I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion that the LAPD’s use of the V-100 may be regulated prospectively, through a carefully tailored injunction. The LAPD’s contention that use of any particular weaponry may only be reviewed retrospectively on a case-by-case basis is frivolous.
First, it is well settled that “a pattern or practice of official conduct that is alleged to violate Fourth Amendment rights may be challenged by an aggrieved individual in a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 266, fn. 19 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 566, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2346] (conc. opn. of White, J.), citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) 436 U.S. 547 [56 L.Ed.2d 525, 98 S.Ct. 1970] [action for declaratory relief under the Fourth Amendment]; accord, Lankford v. Gelston (4th Cir. 1966) 364 F.2d 197, 202 (en banc); White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222]; Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890 [313 P.2d 844]; Wirin v. Horrall (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 497, 504-505 [193 P.2d 470] [actions for injunctive relief under the Fourth Amendment].)6
[37]Contrary to the LAPD’s assertion, injunctions have issued to control the future use of particular weaponry by the police. (See, e.g., Wirin v. Parker, supra, 48 Cal.2d 890 [affirming issuance of an injunction to prohibit use of concealed microphones in the surveillance of private residences absent a search warrant].)
Second, in cases retrospectively challenging police practices, the courts routinely announce categorical rules that not only resolve the question whether the police acted properly in the case before the court but also define the circumstances, if any, in which such practices may be used in the future. Though technically not injunctions, such rules obviously have precisely the same effect. (See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1 [85 L.Ed.2d 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694]; Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204 [68 L.Ed.2d 38, 101 S.Ct. 1642]; Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [63 L.Ed.2d 639, 100 S.Ct. 1371]; Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391].) Consider Tennessee v. Garner, supra, 471 U.S. 1. There, the Supreme Court confronted the issue whether police use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing 15-year-old suspected felon violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that it did and announced the rule that such force may be used only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the fleeing suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others. (Id., at p. 11 [85 L.Ed.2d at p. 10].) The effect of that holding is to enjoin police across the nation from using deadly force to effectuate an arrest except in the circumstances sanctioned.
Thus, I must reject as frivolous the LAPD’s contention that its use of the V-100 may only be reviewed retrospectively. Unlike the majority, however, I would not delegate review of its use to magistrates for a case-by-case determination. The V-100 should be used only in those cases where it is necessary to rescue an individual threatened with serious injury or death.
II.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the indiscriminate use of force to gain entry to a house to execute an arrest or search. As the Supreme Court has explained, “reasonableness’ is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment. . . .” (Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 559 [56 L.Ed.2d at p. 538].) Even searches “supported by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized” are unlawful if executed in an unreasonable manner. (Id., at p. 560 [56 L.Ed.2d at p. 538]; accord Dalia v. United States (1979) 441 U.S. 238, 258 [60 L.Ed.2d 177, 193, 99 S.Ct. 1682]; United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S. 452, 464-465 [76 L.Ed. 877, 882, 52 S.Ct. 420]; see also Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 38 [10 [38]L.Ed.2d 726, 740-741, 83 S.Ct. 1623].) The same is trae, of course, in the case of arrest. (See Tennessee v. Garner, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 7-8 [85 L.Ed.2d at pp. 7-8].)
It is equally well settled that “reasonableness” requires the balancing of competing interests. On this point, the majority correctly conclude that, for the purpose of Fourth Amendment analysis, the question as to whether the LAPD may use the V-100 to effectuate a search or arrest must be judged by balancing its intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (Tennessee v. Garner, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 7 [85 L.Ed.2d at p. 7]; Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 654 [59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 667-668].)
It does not necessarily follow, however, that such balancing should be done on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis by a magistrate. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court and various legal scholars have observed, “if courts and law enforcement officials are to have workable rales, . . . this balancing must in large part be done on a categorical basis” by the appellate courts. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 219-220 [60 L.Ed.2d 824, 840, 99 S.Ct. 2248] (conc. opn. of White, J.); see also id., at pp. 213-214 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 836-837]; Illinois v. Lafayette (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 647-649 [77 L.Ed.2d 65, 71-73, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610-2611]; see generally LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith ” (1982) 43 U.Pitt. L.Rev. 307, 321; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment (1974) 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 375-377, 393-394.)
This latter alternative seems particularly appropriate here, since even under the balancing process which my colleagues would have a magistrate perform, an officer could not use the V-100 to gain entry to a target home.
The intrusiveness of this manner of entry is unparalleled. “It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748 [80 L.Ed.2d 732, 742, 104 S.Ct. 2091]; accord Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. 573, 585 [63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650]; United States v. United States District Court (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 313 [32 L.Ed.2d 752, 764, 92 S.Ct. 2125]; People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 272-276 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333].)
Intrusions into the home—even nonconsensual forcible entries—typically do not cause or risk physical injury to the occupants. Use of the V-100, however, risks precisely such injury, as well as several additional extraordinary harms. It risks not just serious physical harm to the occupants as it [39]“smashes blindly through the walls of a residence” but also injury to the property and persons of those who live nearby (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30, 31). It causes greater damage to the target house than would any conventional means of forced entry. With it, the state proposes to severely damage, if not destroy, the home of a citizen not yet convicted of a criminal offense; to risk his health, if not his life; and to risk harm to his neighbors. In light of these dangers, I must agree with my colleagues that use of the V-100 as the means of gaining entry to homes is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Against this presumptively unreasonable intrusion must be weighed society’s interests in effective law enforcement. Here, the issue revolves around the police’s ability to effectuate an arrest of a person suspected of a crime or to search for evidence of a crime. The law has long prohibited the use of force to enter a home—no matter how de minimis—except in a limited range of circumstances. These include a refusal of admittance following announcement by the police of their authority and purpose, and the existence of an emergency requiring an immediate, unannounced entry, such as the need to prevent loss or destruction of evidence, harm to officers or others, or escape. (Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at pp. 38-41 [10 L.Ed.2d at pp. 740-743] (opn. of Clark, J.), id., at pp. 54-60 [10 L.Ed.2d at pp. 750-754] (opn. of Brennan, J.); Miller v. United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301 [2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 78 S.Ct. 1190]; People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 877 [109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208]; People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86-89 [81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129]; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586 [63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706]; see also Pen. Code, §§ 844, 845, 855, 1531.)
These settled rules necessarily restrict the scope of the inquiry here. All that need be evaluated is the strength of the state’s interest in using the V-100 as a means of gaining entry to a “fortified” structure to carry out a search or arrest in the limited circumstances where a forcible entry is permitted.7
Absent exigent circumstances, an occupant’s mere refusal to admit the police into his or her home to conduct a lawful search or arrest can never justify use of the V-100. The police have available in their arsenal alternative means of entering even “fortified” structures.
[40]These means are far less destructive and dangerous than an entry with the V-100.8 Moreover, where there is no danger of destruction of evidence, or escape, or serious injury to officers or others, such means are equally as effective as the V-100, even though somewhat more time-consuming.
Under these circumstances, use of the V-100 would constitute a gratuitously destructive act which would be per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (United States v. Fernandez (N.D.Cal. 1976) 430 F. Supp. 794, 800; see also, e.g., People v. Vollheim (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 538 [150 Cal.Rptr. 837]; United States v. Moreno (9th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 815, vacated and remanded on other grounds (1984) 469 U.S. 913 [83 L.Ed.2d 223, 105 S.Ct. 286].)
What, then, of a case involving the danger of destruction or loss of evidence? As a practical matter, this danger arises primarily in connection with lawful searches for evidence of drug and gambling offenses, because evidence of these crimes is or can be peculiarly amenable to ready destruction. Here, it is argued that effectiveness in conducting searches for evidence of drug crimes in “fortified” houses requires use of the V-100 because there is no less intrusive alternative that will allow the police to make a sufficiently rapid entry to prevent such destruction.
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it lacks evidentiary support. Consider the record. The LAPD has not come forward with even a single incident in which their attempt to execute a warrant on a “rock house” by conventional means resulted in a delay and subsequent destruction of evidence. In every reported incident, the suspects’ attempt to destroy narcotics was frustrated by speedy police entry. The LAPD’s conclusory statements that such destruction is likely to occur absent use of the V-100 are purely speculative.
Second, the Legislature has provided the police with a means of shutting down “rock houses” which is far less intrusive than their destruction by a V-100. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11366, 11366.5, 11366.6.9) As a result, the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts to prevent the distribution of dangerous drugs is not dependent upon catching the dealers red-handed.
One of these statutes, section 11366, has been on the books for some time. It makes it a felony to “open[ ] or maintain[ ] any place for the purpose [41]of unlawfully selling, giving away, or using” dangerous and unlawful drugs such as, for example, cocaine and heroin.
The other two statutes, sections 11366.5 and 11366.6, are of more recent origin. They were enacted by the Legislature, at the request of the LAPD, among others, in order to give the police a more effective means of eradicating the use of fortified buildings to distribute dangerous drugs than the V-100.10 Section 11366.5, like section 11366, is specifically directed at landlords who, desirous of obtaining “excessive profits” from their holdings, “knowingly” allow their properties “to be fortified to suppress law enforcement entry in order to further the sale of any amount of cocaine, heroin, or phencyclidine . . . .” (§ 11366.5, subd. (b).) Such individuals are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years. (Ibid.)
Section 11366.6, on the other hand, is specifically directed at the dealer-on-the-scene, who “utilizes a building, room, space, or enclosure specifically designed to suppress law enforcement entry in order to sell or possess for sale any amount of cocaine, heroin, or phencyclidine . . . .” Such conduct is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years for each violation of the statute, a punishment equal to or greater than they would receive if they were found in possession of a saleable quantity of these narcotics. (Cf. § 11366.6, subd. (b) with §§ 11351, 11352, 11378.5.)
Aside from the deterrent effect such statutes can reasonably be expected to have on the proliferation of “rock houses,” it is significant that a conviction of these offenses is in no way dependent upon the police catching a dealer or landlord on the premises with narcotics in hand. Proof of possession is not necessary to establish a violation of section 11366 (People v. [42]Cannon (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 163 [306 P.2d 589]) nor, by parity of reasoning, is it necessary under either section 11366.5 or section 11366.6.11
As a result, even in those cases where evidence might be destroyed before police gained entry to a “fortified” structure by conventional means, the people, through their elected representatives, have demonstrated that measures short of the destruction are available to quell such criminal efforts to avoid detection and punishment. The Legislature’s prompt and highly commendable action in passing sections 11366.5 and 11366.6 ensures that the community’s interest in preventing the distribution of these dangerous drugs cannot be frustrated by narcotics dealers who hide behind even layer-upon-layer of steel bars and doors. With the enactment of these statutes, police resort to weapons of war such as the V-100 are no longer even arguably necessary to stop narcotics dealers in their tracks.
Similar alternatives are available to the police vis-a-vis purveyors of unlawful games of chance, evidence of which is readily amenable to destruction, a class that seemingly would encompass only bookmaking. (See Pen. Code, §§ 337a, 11225-11230.)12 And, there is no reason to doubt that, should use of “fortified” houses for the distribution of illegal drugs other than heroin, cocaine, and phencyclidine, become a problem, the Legislature will act promptly to extend the reach of sections 11366.5 and 11366.6 to deter and punish such conduct.13 As a result, I am compelled to conclude that the use of the V-100 is neither sufficiently productive nor necessary to outweigh its intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests in cases involving a danger of destruction or loss of evidence.
The use of the V-100 in cases involving a “danger of escape” is equally unwise. Effectiveness in preventing escapes scarcely seems likely to be materially improved by using the V-100. On this, my colleagues apparently agree. They, too, would not allow the use of the V-100 in such circumstances, even if authorized by a magistrate. The danger of escape is not one of [43]the exigencies which they hold would permit its use. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)
This brings us to the final category of cases in which use of force is ever allowable in gaining entry to a home—the threat of serious injury to officers or others. The LAPD insists that effectiveness in making arrests and in conducting searches at “fortified” dwellings requires use of the V-100, where there is a significant danger of armed resistance. We are told that the presence of “fortifications” increases the likelihood that the police will face such resistance if entry is attempted via conventional means.
No evidence has been offered to support this contention. However, even if we were to assume its truth, this argument fails. The simple fact is that there is always an alternative available to the police in the face of a threat that they will be fired upon if they attempt entry by force. They can encircle the target house, announce their authority and purpose, and simply wait out the suspects inside. Eventually, the suspects must surrender.
Alternatively, the police can place the target house under surveillance and wait to serve their search or arrest warrant until the suspects attempt to leave or inadvertently make a point of entry possible. (See, ante, fn. 3, at p. 35.)
Such tactics are not new. Nor are they dramatic. But history attests to their effectiveness. Moreover, these are safe alternatives.
The V-100, with all its power, is unable to climb stairs and it will not fit into elevators. Its use against a “fortified” house blocked off by the vehicles of innocent citizens is also not feasible. (See, ante, fn. 3, at p. 35.) Given these facts, there seems little reason to endorse its use against a structure fortuitously accessible.
I do not minimize the possibility of attack by the occupants of a “fortified” house on police. However, the citizens of Philadelphia who lost their homes on May 13, 1985, when the police bombed a fortified house there would no doubt have preferred patience to counterattack, especially given the innocent young children who died in the blaze that followed. The events in Philadelphia serve as a reminder that we should be extraordinarily cautious about authorizing use of any weapon of war in our residential neighborhoods. This is especially true if the weapon is not essential to effective law enforcement.14
[44]In sum, the only circumstance in which use of the V-100 is even arguably justifiable is for rescue, that is, to save the life of a hostage who is unquestionably in danger. For that reason, I would hold that plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting its use in other circumstances.
One newspaper report observes that the government uses the V-100 “to guard nuclear power plants and warhead factories.” (Klein, Rock Houses: Police Ram Opens Door to Debate, L.A. Times, supra, at p. 1.) The report describes the vehicles as “lookpng] like little tanks with tires. They weigh 6.4 tons, [can] travel 62 miles an hour, can withstand small-arms fire and can climb a 30% grade.” (Ibid.)
Although the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) prefers to use the euphemism “motorized battering ram” to refer to its specially equipped V-100, the department somewhat grudgingly admits that it would be “perceived to be a tank,” which is what plaintiffs prefer to call it. Hereafter, the ram shall be referred to simply as the V-100, even though the “tank” description appears wholly accurate.
Although the LAPD gave its officers authority to use the V-100 on five other occasions during 1985, they did not employ it because of “changed circumstances” encountered at the scene of execution of these search warrants.
There is no indication in the record as to the nature of these “changed circumstances.” However, the Los Angeles Times reports that, in one instance, the officers found a side door open and were able simply to walk in, while in another the house was blocked off by cars, thus preventing use of the V-100. (Klein, The Ram at Rest: These Are Quiet Times for the LAPD’s ‘Battering’ Vehicle, L.A. Times (Feb. 10, 1986) Home Ed., Metro Section, at p. 1.) The V-100 is also useless, of course, against “rock houses” located in multi-story buildings above ground level.
Prior raids by coventional means on two other houses owned by Bryant—including 13031 Louvre Street—turned up weapons. The occupants of these houses did not, however, use these weapons to resist entry by the police. Moreover, the occupants were unsuccessful in their attempt to destroy the narcotics in their possession.
Plaintiffs have repeatedly argued the fact no weapons were discovered in the course of the first three raids in which the ram was used as evidence that the LAPD’s policies governing its use are constitutionally inadequate. However, it is well settled that “a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law, it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success [or failure].” (United States v. Di Re (1948) 332 U.S. 581, 595 [92 L.Ed. 210, 220, 68 S.Ct. 222].) Accordingly, paragraphs (6) through (9) summarize only those facts known to the LAPD at the time of entry on each of the four occasions on which the ram was used. The facts learned subsequent to entry are irrelevant.
December 1983, two LAPD officers were seriously injured by gunfire during execution of a search warrant on a “rock house.” The police admit, however, that in narcotics cases the danger of such armed resistance is not limited to raids on “rock houses,” and there is no evidence in this record which suggests that officers have in fact encountered such resistance more frequently in raids on “rock houses” than in other raids.
The only difference between federal and California law in this regard concerns the showing a party must make in order to establish that he or she is “an aggrieved individual” and so entitled to bring such an action. California’s requirements are less stringent than those imposed by federal law. (Compare Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983) 461 U.S. 95 [75 L.Ed.2d 675, 103 S.Ct. 1660] with White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 762-765.)
The LAPD concedes that there are fully effective, less dangerous means of gaining entry to all but “fortified” houses. It is only against such fortified premises as “rock houses” that they seek the right to use the V-100 in making an arrest or search.
The alternatives available to the police include hand-held sledgehammers and battering rams, Kerry cutting cables, and the use of ropes and a fork-lift to pull off bars or pull down doors.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.
These two statutes were enacted in 1985 pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1862. (See Stats. 1985, ch. 1533, §§ 1, 2.) The committee reports discussing this bill describe the need for its passage as follows: “Proponents [including the LAPD] contend that fortification of homes, apartments, and other structures gives dealers time to destroy drugs, and valuable evidence and that use of battering rams and 'other extreme measures’ to force entry have thus far been ineffective and highly controversial. . . .“ (Sen. Comm. Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1862, Sen. Rules Com. (1985) at p. 2 [italics added]; Assem. Com. Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1862, Com. on Public Safety (1985) at p. 1.)
These committee reports are appropriate sources of legislative intent. (See, e.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 847, fn. 9 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380]; Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 219 [185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912], and dis. opn. of Mosk, J., at p. 221; In re Marriage of Brigden (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 380, 391 [145 Cal.Rptr. 716].)
It is, perhaps, worthy of note that the state was able successfully to convict, under section 11366.5, the owner of three of the four “rock houses” against which the V-100 was used, even though the LAPD apparently “ ‘never caught him at the houses or with any drugs.’ ” (Quinn, Pacoima Cocaine Ring: ‘Rock House’ Landlord Gets Prison Sentence, L.A. Times (Mar. 14, 1986) Home Ed., Metro Section, at p. 2.)
Since gambling offenses do not typically involve violence and are classified only as misdemeanors, it cannot seriously be contended that their commission warrants use of such a dangerous and destructive weapon as the V-100. The “seriousness of the underlying criminal offense” is, of course, one of the factors included in the majority’s balancing test. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)
In the interim, use of such premises to obstruct the police would be punishable under Penal Code section 148 which proscribes willful resistance, delay, or obstruction of a peace officer in the discharge or attempted discharge of his duties.
On this point, it is interesting to note that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department has apparently developed a motorized battering ram that is as effective as the V-100 but involves none of the dangers which the V-100 poses. (Klein, The Ram at Rest: These are Quiet Times for LAPD’s ‘Battering’ Vehicle, L.A. Times, supra, at p. 1.)