People v. Barnett (1998) · DecisionDepot

People v. Barnett

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
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California Supreme Court May 4, 1998 No. S008113Published

Before: Baxter

74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 (1998) 954 P.2d 384 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

Lee Max BARNETT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S008113. Supreme Court of California.

May 4, 1998. Rehearing Denied July 8, 1998. [136] Michael A. Willemsen, Palo Alto, and Ron Parravano, Monterey, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, W. Scott Thorpe and Ruth M. Saavedra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, Justice.

Defendant Lee Max Barnett was convicted by a jury of one count of murder (Pen.Code, § 187),[1] two counts of robbery (§ 211), one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and four counts of kidnapping (§ 207). The jury found true the special circumstances that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the crime of robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i)), that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the crime of kidnapping (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(ii)), and that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). It also found true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robberies and kidnappings (§ 12022.5). After the jury returned a verdict of death, the trial court denied the automatic motion to modify penalty (§ 190.4, subd. (e)).[2] Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

We find no prejudicial error at the guilt or penalty phase of defendant's trial. We therefore affirm the judgment in its entirety.

I. FACTS

A. The Guilt Phase

The instant crimes occurred when two groups of people unexpectedly confronted each other on July 6, 1986, at a remote campsite in the Forest Ranch area of Butte County. The evidence at trial included testimony from those involved in the confrontation, including defendant, and from others who had contact with defendant the summer before the confrontation and immediately afterward.

Related research

Since Butter, supra, 65 Cal.2d 569, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703, was decided, a number of other jurisdictions have rejected the claim-of-right defense for public policy reasons in cases where force, violence, or weapons are used for self-help debt collection. (E.g., State v. Mejia (1995) 141 N.J. 475, 662 A.2d 308; State v. Self (1986) 42 Wash.App. 654, 713 P.2d 142 [rejecting majority's reasoning in Butler]; People v, Hodges (1985) 113 A.D.2d 514, 496 N.Y.S.2d 771 [same]; State v. Winston (1982) 170 W.Va. 555, 295 S.E.2d 46 [defense unavailable where accused takes money or other property, to which he did not have a specific ownership claim, in satisfaction of a debt]; Com. v. Dombrauskas (1980) 274 Pa.Super. 452, 418 A.2d 493 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler]; State v. Russell (1975) 217 Kan. 481, 536 P.2d 1392; Cotes v. State (Md.1974) 21 Md.App. 363, 320 A.2d 75 [citing favorably to Justice Mosk's dissent in Butler ]; Crawford v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1974) 509 S.W.2d 582; State v. Martin (1973) 15 Or.App. 498, 516 P.2d 753; Edwards v. State (1970) 49 Wis.2d 105, 181 N.W.2d 383 [defense unavailable if accused cannot trace ownership to specific personal property or money (i.e., bills or coins) taken from the claimed debtor]; People v. Uselding (1969) 107 Ill.App.2d 305, 247 N.E.2d 35; cf. State v. Lewis (App.1978) 121 Ariz. 155, 589 P.2d 29 [defense unavailable where claimed debt was unliquidated].) As several courts have observed, the proposition that a claim of right negates the felonious intent in robbery "`not only is lacking in sound reason and logic, but it is utterly incompatible with and has no place in an ordered and orderly society such as ours, which eschews self-help through violence. Adoption of the proposition would be but one step short of accepting lawless reprisal as an appropriate means of redressing grievances, real or fancied.'" (State v. Mejia, supra, 662 A.2d at p. 319; People v. Hodges, supra, 496 N.Y.S.2d at p. 774; State v. Winston, supra, 295 S.E.2d at p. 51; State v. Martin, supra, 516 P.2d at p. 756.)

Moreover, while testimony alleging rape can be inflammatory, we are convinced that the evidence in this case clearly did not prejudice defendant. As properly admitted evidence in aggravation the jury had before it the circumstances of the instant crime showing that defendant committed murder while engaged in the crimes of robbery and kidnapping and that the killing was intentional and involved the infliction of torture with a large knife. The jury also heard evidence of other violent sexual crimes by defendant, to wit, evidence that in 1977 defendant raped and sodomized 17-year-old Mae G. and forced her at knife point to orally copulate him. Also offered was evidence of defendant's various felony convictions and his assaults upon police officers and other individuals, as follows. In 1965, defendant was convicted of second degree assault on a state trooper, transportation of a stolen vehicle across state lines and felony attempted prisoner escape. In 1969, defendant robbed the clerk of a liquor store twice. In 1970, he was convicted of five counts of armed robbery; at the time of his arrest he had raised a loaded handgun but was stopped from using it by an officer. In 1971, defendant attempted to rob a restaurant owner at gunpoint. As he fled in his car he hit a police officer in the leg and sideswiped a police car; he was then shot in the leg after he pointed a gun at an officer. In 1972, defendant robbed a gas station attendant at gunpoint. In 1973, he resisted being transported back to jail from a medical facility and had to be Maced. In 1979, defendant was convicted of the assault and beating of David Sinopoli. In 1987, he slashed a fellow jail inmate with a razor blade. In 1987, he caused a disturbance in the jail yard by refusing to wear his jumpsuit; he also attempted to punch an officer in the head. In 1988, defendant spit at three correctional officers and kicked the window out of a transportation van. Also in 1988, defendant tried to kick out the windows of another patrol car and he spit in another officer's face. On appeal, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to these other incidents in aggravation.

The capital sentencing scheme is not unconstitutional insofar as it does not require the jury to make findings on the aggravating factors supporting its death verdict. (People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 271-272, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.) There is no constitutional requirement that all aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating factors must outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or that death must be found to be the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 152-153, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 536, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779.) Introduction of evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity under factor (b) does not offend the federal Constitution (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 863, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 76, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118; People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 478, 24 [209] Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808) and federal constitutional law does not require instruction on the elements of the crimes presented under factor (b) (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 704, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 49, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673). The capital sentencing scheme is not unconstitutional insofar as it permits a jury that has convicted a defendant of capital murder to determine, on the issue of penalty, whether the defendant committed alleged prior criminal acts to be considered in aggravation. (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1194, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 252-253, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) There is no categorical constitutional prohibition on the introduction of facts and evidence underlying a defendant's prior felony convictions. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481 [rejecting argument that Taylor v. United States (1990) 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 requires a contrary conclusion]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 656 & fn. 8,20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80 [same].) Use of the words "extreme" and "substantial" in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), does not impermissibly limit consideration of mitigating factors in violation of the federal Constitution. (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 276, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1227-1228, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.)

People v. Barnett

I. FACTS

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Related research

II. DISCUSSION

C. Guilt Phase Issues

III. DISPOSITION

NOTES