Farnsworth v. Farnsworth
Before: Doran
DORAN, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment in a divorce action, “with the exception of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage. ’ ’
The parties were married July 16, 1936; they separated March 30, 1945. There are no children, the issue of the marriage. Respondent husband was a practicing physician and following the marriage appellant worked in respondent’s office. Quoting from appellant’s brief, “She continued to work in that fashion after separation and until sometime in 1945. The reason that she continued to work after separation was that she had taken care of the business for so many years; that there was no one competent to take her place. Respondent was not there and she endeavored to keep his practice going and take care of things as well as she could. At no time did she receive any salary or compensation for any of the work that she performed in his office from the inception thereof to the conclusion. Prior to her marriage to respondent, appellant had worked for him in the same capacity for three years. ’ ’ The' divorce was sought and granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty.
It will be noted that Cora K. Farnsworth is named as a defendant and that Helen M. Farnsworth appears as intervener; the former is the respondent’s mother and the latter is the respondent’s wife by a former marriage. There are three minor children, the issue of this first marriage, and Helen M. Farnsworth, the mother of the children, filed the complaint in intervention to protect a lien existing by order of court to insure the payment of $300 per month by respondent for their support. Cora K. Farnsworth, the respondent’s mother, is named as a defendant because, as plaintiff alleges, certain property of record in her name is in truth the community property of the parties.
The court found in substance, quoting from appellant’s brief, ‘ ‘ That since the marriage of the parties respondent has without provocation inflicted grievous physical and mental suffering upon appellant and has thereby made the further continuance of the marital relations of said parties intolerable. That certain real and personal property has been acquired by the parties subsequent to their marriage and that said property had been purchased with funds acquired by
them
[382]
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