DOOLING, J. The appeals of John Schuyten and Inez G. Schuyten, though presented on separate records, were consolidated in this court and both appeals present identical questions of law. Appellant John Schuyten was a certificated employee of Contra Costa Junior College District, employed as a teacher by the district from 1950 to the date of his discharge. Appellant Inez G. Schuyten was similarly employed as a teacher by Richmond Union High School District from 1949 until her discharge.
' On May 8, 1954, both appellants appeared before a one-man subcommittee of the Fact Finding Committe of the California Senate on Un-American Activities. They had been given less than 24 hours notice to appear for this hearing and requested a continuance to enable them to consult with their attorney and to be represented by him in their interrogation by the subcommittee. This request was denied and the interrogation proceeded under a stipulation by which, as found by the trial court, as to any question which either refused to answer, such “defendant refused to answer said questions on the basis of all legal and constitutional rights, both State and Federal, available to the defendant, including, specifically, hut not limited to the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the corresponding sections of the Constitution of the State of California.”
Both appellants refused to answer various questions about their past associations and activities, including the following questions:
[52]Appellant John Sehuyten refused to answer this question:
“Q. Is it not a fact that you were a member of the Communist Party during the years 1946 and 1947 and up to and including a portion of the year 1950?”
Similarly appellant Inez G. Sehuyten refused to answer this question put to her:
“Q. Is it not a fact, Mrs. Sehuyten, that you were a member of the Communist Party at the time you accepted the position that you now attain and that your membership in the Communist Party continued during the years 1946, 1947 and up to and including part of the year 1950 ?”
Bach appellant was given a notice of intention to dismiss him from his position on the ground that the failure to answer these • questions was a violation of Education Code, section 12604, each demanded a hearing and respondent thereupon instituted these actions in the superior court to dismiss appellants under section 13529 of the Education Code.
The portion of section 12604, Education Code, which is here involved provided at that time (Stats. 1953, p. 3341):
“It shall be the duty of any employee of any school district who may be subpenaed by ... a California Legislative UnAmerican Activities Committee or a subcommittee thereof . . . to appear before said committee or subcommittee and specifically to answer under oath a question or questions propounded by any member or counsel of the committee or subcommittee relating to:
“(d) Past knowing membership of such employee in the Communist Party at any time since September 10, 1948.
“Any employee who fails or refuses to answer . . . any such question . . . shall be guilty of insubordination and guilty of violating this section and shall be suspended and dismissed from his employment in the manner provided by law.”
It is conceded by counsel for respondents that the failure to answer the two questions quoted above is the sole ground relied upon by respondents as justification for the judgments discharging appellants from which these appeals are taken.
Various constitutional attacks are leveled against the judgments and the proceedings leading up to them, but in our view these need not be considered. It is to be noticed that the Legislature, for reasons best known to it, in this section and in the cognate section 12602 (Stats. 1953, p. 3341) enacted at the same time, fixed a demarcation point at September 10, 1948. With membership in the Communist Party prior to that [53]date neither section concerns itself. It is only with regard to membership in the Communist Party at any time since September 10, 1948, that a teacher must file the affidavit required by Education Code, section 12602, and it is only the refusal to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party since September 10, 1948, which is made grounds for dismissal by Education Code, section 12604.
In view of this fact counsel for appellants point out that each of the crucial questions here involved was compound or duplicitous in relation to the provision of section 12604, subdivision (d), in that in each the appellant was asked in a single question about membership in the Communist Party both before September 10, 1948, and after September 10, 1948. As to that portion of each integrated question which was addressed to the period from 1946 to September 10, 1948, the appellant was privileged by the express terms of the section to refuse to answer it without incurring the penalty of dismissal.
Counsel for respondents argue that no objection to the compound form of the question was interposed before the subcommittee. The stipulation, as found by the trial court, under which the testimony was given could not have been broader. We repeat “defendant refused to answer ... on the basis of all legal and constitutional rights ...” The stipulation was proposed to meet appellants’ request for a continuance so that they might have the benefit of their attorney’s presence in the protection of their rights at the hearing. It was intended to be and is broad enough in its language to cover any legal objection which their attorney might have interposed on their behalf had he been present. To construe it as not including objection to a compound question a part of which appellants had the legal privilege by force of the statute to refuse to answer without incurring the penalty of dismissal would be to ignore the realities. The senator acting as the one-man subcommittee stated the stipulation in the following language:
“And then you will make the stipulation, and I want this clear in the record for your sake, and be sure there is no misunderstanding about it, that the witness declines to answer the questions on the grounds of all the legal and constitutional rights, both State and Federal, that may be available to her.”
Counsel for respondents further argue that the question was not raised in the trial court. It was in fact raised at the first possible opportunity by the demurrer to each complaint, the demurrer pointing out specifically, after quoting the compound [54]question, in Mrs. Schuyten’s case that “Section 12604 covers only questions relating to membership in the Communist Party since September 10, 1948,” and a similar specification being found in the demurrer interposed by Mr. Schuyten.
The vice of the compound or duplicitous question is generally recognized. (27 Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 56, pp. 73-74; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 567, p. 317; 98 C.J.S., Witnesses, § 328, pp. 33-34; Godfrey v. Miller, 80 Cal. 420, 423 [22 P. 290]; Davis v. Baugh, 59 Cal. 568, 578.) Particularly is such a question objectionable when it includes both inadmissible and admissible matters. In such cases the objection to the entire question is properly sustained. (Davis v. Baugh, supra, 59 Cal. 568, 578; 27 Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 56, p. 73; 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 567, p. 317.)
In the comparable situation of an offer of proof it is stated in 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 17b(2), page 320: “If several facts are included in the offer, some admissible and others inadmissible, then the whole (if properly objected to) is inadmissible; in other words, it is for the proponent to sever the good and the bad parts.” (Emphasis the author’s.) This rule is well settled in the decisions of our own courts. (Swafford v. Board of Education, 127 Cal. 484, 487 [59 P. 900]; Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co., 139 Cal.App.2d 121, 134 [293 P.2d 531]; Eaton v. Brock, 124 Cal.App.2d 10, 16 [268 P.2d 58]; Clark v. Bradley, 106 Cal.App.2d 537, 545 [235 P.2d 439]; Lewis v. Western Truck Line, 44 Cal.App.2d 455, 465 [112 P.2d 747].)
The unfairness of the composite questions in this ease is particularly clear. In neither question was the date fixed by section 12604, i.e. September 10, 1948, specified or referred to. In the single sweeping question each appellant was asked about membership in the Communist Party from 1946 until 1950. As to the period between 1946 and September 10, 1948, the Legislature had given appellants the privilege of refusing to answer without incurring the penalty of dismissal. How were they to exercise this privilege in the face of a question which integrated such a period of time with another period of time as to which such privilege was denied them by the same statute? To meet their objection of appearing without the legal protection of their attorney’s presence the senator acting as subcommittee voluntarily offered them a stipulation, which they accepted, that their refusal to answer any question would be on every legal ground open to them. An objection that the questions included a period of time as to which they were [55]privileged by the statute to refuse to answer without incurring the penalty of dismissal with a period of time as to which they had no such statutory privilege, if expressly interposed, would have been good. The broad stipulation under which they were testifying must be held to be the equivalent of such an objection.
It must be remembered that appellants were not charged with past or present membership in the Communist Party. Respondents’ counsel expressly disavow any such claim. They were charged with, and the whole ease against them rests on, the failure to answer the two questions quoted herein. Their refusal to answer those questions is not proof that if they had been asked any question limited to a time after September 10, 1948, they would have refused to answer such question. The plain fact is that they were never put to that test.
On the record before us we must hold that the violation by appellants of Education Code, section 12604, subdivision (d) was not proved.
The judgments are reversed with directions to the trial court to enter judgments for appellants.
Draper, J., concurred.