McDonald v. McDonald
Before: Drapeau
DRAPEAU, J.
By her last will Callie I. McDonald left all of the residue of her estate, share alike, to her two surviving sons, Lester and Ronald McDonald. She appointed her son Lester executor without bond. Her will was handwritten, and dated in 1947. The residue comprised practically all of her estate, there being no specific bequests of any moment, and very little debt.
[720]
Callie’s husband and her youngest son died before her. There was litigation in the husband’s estate, because he deeded most of his property to his youngest son before he died. The result of this litigation was to vest the greater part of that estate in Callie as her community property.
Lester McDonald was a business man. He took ■ care of his mother’s property from the time she got it until she died. There was always a close relationship of trust and confidence between Lester and his mother.
Ronald McDonald was an invalid. He had nothing to do with his mother’s property. He was querulous and fault finding with her, and he definitely didn’t share her trust in his brother Lester. But his mother was always solicitous of his welfare. She gave him the home where he lives. And she gave him for his support approximately one-third of the net income from her property. She gave another third of the income to Lester, and kept the remaining third for her own living expenses.
After Callie died in 1951 Ronald found out that in 1946 she had deeded to Lester two parcels of real property, leaving for herself only a business building in Bakersfield. One of the parcels deeded was a ranch in San Luis Obispo County. The other parcel was oil property in Kern County. The income from the oil property was a good part of Callie’s total income.
The deed of the San Luis Obispo County property was recorded two years before Callie died. The deed of the Kern County property was recorded after she died. No monetary consideration was paid by Lester for the deeds. At the time they were made Callie signed typewritten statements to the effect that she made the deeds to Lester because of money paid out for her by him over a period of years, and for services rendered by him to her. It may fairly be inferred that Lester prepared these statements.
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