Jordan v. Reynolds

[92]

PEEK, J.

This is the second appeal in a controversy concerning a sawmill located in Mendocino County. In the first appeal (97 Cal.App.2d 194 [217 P.2d 66]) this court reversed a judgment in favor of defendants, the action being for damages for eviction from the sawmill and for conversion of logs, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. We upheld the finding of the trial court that the agreement between the parties was one for the conditional sale of the sawmill by respondent Reynolds to appellants, but we held that the findings as a whole were inconclusive on the question of whether Reynolds was entitled to repossess the sawmill.

Upon the cause being remanded the parties stipulated that the matter could be resubmitted to the trial court upon the evidence theretofore taken. No additional evidence was offered by either party. The trial court again rendered judgment for defendants upon findings that the parties entered into certain agreements (see

Jordan

v.

Reynolds, supra,

p. 196) under which it was agreed that appellants could remove the sawmill from the land where it stood any time after payment to Reynolds of $5,000; that appellants agreed to treat the sawmill as personal property, and that said agreements constituted a conditional sale of said personal property; that appellants agreed to pay Reynolds at the rate of $1.50 per thousand board feet of lumber cut by the mill in a period not to exceed five years; that appellants agreed to commence operating the mill and to operate it continuously in a workmanlike manner at its full rate of productivity except when prevented by bad weather, and if so prevented by bad weather for a period of 30 days to make a minimum payment of $25 per month during such period of idleness; that the following obligations of appellants were conditions precedent to respondents’ obligation to permit them to occupy the said premises; that time was of the essence of the said contract; that appellants entered into possession of the mill in October, 1944, and thereafter operated it for approximately three weeks; that after December, 1944, the mill was not operated by plaintiffs or for their account in a continuous, profitable or workmanlike manner, and was idle for substantially the entire period between December, 1944, and September, 1945; that on September 2, 1945, Reynolds served notice on appellants that their rights in the sawmill would terminate in 30 days; that on October 25, Reynolds peaceably took possession of the sawmill, it previously having been abandoned by appellants,