People v. Covington

THE

COURT.

A petition for hearing was granted in order to consider more fully the question whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict finding the appellants guilty of the crime of robbery. After further consideration of the record we are satisfied that proof of essential elements of robbery is lacking, but that the appellants are, under the evidence, guilty of petty theft. We are in accord with the disposition of the appeal on this and other points by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, and adopt with slight modifications the opinion of that court, prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Conrey, as the opinion of this court, as follows:

“By information in three counts the defendants were accused as follows: By Count I it was charged that on March 5, 1933, the defendants murdered one Marjorie Barr; by Count II it was charged that on the same date the defendants committed the crime of robbery, said crime being a different offense of the same class of crimes and

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offenses as the charge set forth in Count I, and connected in its commission. It was alleged that the defendants did wilfully, etc., take from said Marjorie Barr ‘the goods and personal property in the possession of Marjorie Barr’, without her consent, etc., and ‘by means of force used by said defendants upon and against the said Marjorie Barr, and by said defendants then and there putting the said Marjorie Barr in fear’.

“By Count III it was charged that on said date the defendants committed the crime of burglary by wilfully entering the house of one Stephens, with the intent then and there to commit theft. It was alleged that this crime was a different offense but connected in its commission with the crime set forth in Counts I and II.

“The defendant Peterson was convicted on Count I and Count II, and acquitted on Count III. The other defendants, who are appellants here, were acquitted on Counts I and III and were convicted of robbery as charged in Count II. This appeal is from the judgment of conviction of appellants on Count II, and from the orders of the court denying their motions for a new trial.