Opinion
RICHARDSON, J. In these consolidated cases we consider whether or not a civil action brought by law enforcement officers to restrain the exhibition of obscene books and films states a cause of action for relief under the public nuisance laws of this state. Plaintiffs, who are law enforcement officers acting on behalf of both the City and the County of Los Angeles, seek injunctive and other relief against defendants who, according to the five separate complaints filed herein, operate book stores or motion picture theaters in Los Angeles which exhibit magazines or films that are obscene under the laws of this state. While the five complaints are directed at different defendants and vary somewhat in the specifics of their allegations, the causes of action alleged in each are sufficiently similar in the facts alleged and in the charging allegations to permit us to consider them together.
For convenience we examine the pleadings in the case involving Projection Room Theater finding that our conclusions in that action are dispositive of the issues raised in all of the actions. Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ operations constitute public nuisances which are subject to regulation and abatement either pursuant to the general public nuisance statutes (Civ. Code, §§ 3479, 3480; Pen. Code, §§ 370, 371), or under the Red Light Abatement Law (Pen. Code, § 11225 et seq.). Defendants dispute the contention. We will conclude that although the Red Light Abatement Law was not intended to apply to the exhibition of obscene magazines or films, nevertheless the complaint herein does state a cause
of action under the general public nuisance statutes.
¡
[48]The complaint herein alleges the following facts: Defendants own or operate specified premises in Los Angeles County in which acts of “lewdness” are taking place, namely, the “past and continuing exhibition” of magazines and films “all of which are lewd and obscene under the laws of this State, and therefore did and do constitute a nuisance under the laws of this State .. .It is further alleged that the magazines and films so exhibited by defendants have, as their dominant theme, an “appeal to the prurient interest in sex,” that they are “patently offensive because they affront contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters,” and that they are “utterly without social value____”
According to the complaint, the maintenance of these premises constitutes a public nuisance which will continue unless restrained and enjoined. Plaintiffs attached to the complaint numerous exhibits consisting of police reports summarizing the obscene nature of the magazines and films exhibited by defendants. The complaint sought multiple relief including: (1) preliminary injunction restraining defendants from conducting and maintaining the premises for the purposes described above; (2) abatement of the premises as a public nuisance under sections 11230-11231 of the Penal Code (Red Light Abatement Law); (3) permanent injunction against defendants and their agents, officers and employees from operating the premises as a public nuisance; (4) closure of the premises for one year; (5) removal and sale of the fixtures and movable property thereon used in conducting the nuisance; (6) use of the proceeds from the sale to pay fees and costs in connection with the closure; and (7) other appropriate relief.
Defendants filed general demurrers to each complaint, asserting that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action either under the public nuisance statutes or the Red Light Abatement Law. The trial court, considering itself bound by the decision in Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 941 [100 Cal.Rptr. 576, 50 A.L.R.3d 959], sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered judgments of dismissal. Plaintiffs appeal.
The scope of our inquiry herein is considerably narrowed by application of the familiar rule, acknowledged by defendants, that “a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216]), and we may accordingly assume that all [49]materials in question, both magazines and films, are obscene within the meaning of Penal Code section 311, as alleged.
1. Public Nuisance Statutes
We first consider whether or not the allegations of the complaint, summarized above, sufficiently describe the existence of a public nuisance and note preliminarily the substantial identity of definitions appearing in Penal Code sections 370 and 371, and Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480, taken in conjunction. Section 370 of the Penal Code defines a public nuisance as “[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons, . . (Italics added.) When analyzed, section 370 reveals the following: the proscribed act may be anything which alternatively is injurious to health or is indecent, or offensive to the senses; the results of the act must interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; and those affected by the act may be an entire neighborhood or a considerable number of persons, and as amplified by Penal Code section 371 the extent of the annoyance or damage on the affected individuals may be unequal.
Is the exhibition of obscene magazines and films a form of activity which may be characterized as “indecent” or “offensive to the senses” interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life of a “considerable number of persons” within the contemplation of Penal Code section 370? We conclude that such exhibitions may fairly be deemed such conduct, and we find convincing support for such conclusion from applicable cases in this and other jurisdictions.
In Weis v. Superior Court (1916) 30 Cal.App. 730 [159 P. 464], the Court of Appeal ruled that an attraction known as the “Sultan’s Harem,” conducted at the Panama-Califomia International Exposition, constituted a public nuisance subject to abatement. This exhibition assertedly involved the “indecent and offensive” exposure to members of the public of the “naked persons and private parts thereof” of various female employees. Although such conduct also constituted the crime of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 311), nevertheless the Weis court held that “[wjhere, however, the threatened acts, if committed, in addition to being an indictable offense, will constitute a public nuisance, courts of equity are vested with jurisdiction to interpose their injunctive process to [50]prevent injury which will result from the maintenance thereof. [Citation.]” (Weis at p. 732.) Furthermore, the court, quoting from Wood on Nuisances (§ 68), stated that “ ‘A public exhibition of any kind that tends to the corruption of morals, to a disturbance of the peace, or of the general good order and welfare of society, is a public nuisance. Under this head are: included. . . obscene pictures, and any and all exhibitions, the natural tendency of which is to pander to vicious . . . and disorderly members of society.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
The foregoing Weis reasoning was approved by us more than 30 years ago in People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 879 [118 P.2d 472]. Lim involved the propriety of an injunction against gambling activities on the ground that they constituted a public nuisance. We upheld in Lim the-use of the public nuisance injunctive remedy against gambling activity which, it was alleged, disturbed the public peace and corrupted public morals. In Lim we carefully traced the history of public nuisance actions and noted that “The courts have . . . refused to grant injunctions on behalf of the state except where the objectionable activity can be brought within the terms of the statutory definition of public nuisance.” (P. 879.) Although, as we noted, such activities as gambling or usury do not fit comfortably within the above quoted statutory definition of public nuisance, in Lim we acknowledged that an “indecent” exhibition such as was involved in Weis could be enjoined despite the concurrent application of the criminal statutes, since such exhibitions if determined to be indecent are expressly declared by section 370 to be public nuisances.
While carefully noting that Weis involved live dance performances, we. discern no satisfactory distinction which would justify differential treatment of the pictorial representations in obscene magazines and films on the one hand, and “live” performances on the other. The presentation of either may fairly be described as “indecent” and equally injurious to public morals.
Defendants have insisted that only those activities may constitute public nuisances which are offensive to the five senses of hearing, sight, touch, smell, and taste. It is claimed that public nuisance and abuse of the five senses is coextensive. Defendants in so arguing focus only upon that category of nuisances described in Penal Code section 370 and Civil Code section 3479 as conduct which is “offensive to the senses.” The contention is erroneous for such reasoning completely ignores the additional language appearing in both sections which explicitly includes as an alternative class of public nuisance conduct “anything which is [51]indecent” When the question is put, which of the five senses is offended by conduct that is “indecent,” it becomes readily apparent both that the thesis of the argument does not fit the legislative language and that conduct offensive to a community’s moral sensibilities is likewise subject to regulation under section 370. Thus, the court in Weis, supra, at page 733, unequivocally states that “. . . any act which is an offense against public decency, or any public exhibition which is offensive to the senses, whether of sight, sound, or smell, or which tends to corrupt public morals or disturb the good order and welfare of society, is a public nuisance.” (Italics added.)
The trial court herein, in sustaining defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, considered itself controlled by the holding in Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.3d 941 (hg. den.). Harmer is distinguishable, however, since it involved an action by private citizens to enjoin a particular film being shown at the premises in question. The Harmer court ruled that plaintiff had failed to allege the necessary special damages requisite to bringing a public nuisance action (see Civ. Code, § 3493) thus casting doubt upon his status as a litigant. In contrast, the instant action is brought by public officials acting on behalf of the public generally and proceeding under provisions (see Code Civ. Proc., § 731) which expressly confer standing upon them.
More fundamentally, however, Harmer fails properly to analyze the nature of the state’s interests in regulating the exhibition of obscene matter. Harmer suggests that since “only those members of the community were exposed to the film who voluntarily chose to see it,” therefore “[t]he nuisance was not one which is inflicted or imposed on the public.” (Harmer at p. 943.) Such reasoning frequently advanced and variously stated, misses the point. The fact that obscene or other indecent exhibitions take place behind closed doors and are viewed only by those who choose to view them does not defeat the community’s interest in regulating such exhibitions.
Substantially identical arguments were advanced and rejected by us recently in People v. Luros (1971) 4 Cal.3d 84 [92 Cal.Rptr. 833, 480 P.2d 633], and by the United States Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) 413 U.S. 49 [37 L.Ed.2d 446, 93 S.Ct. 2628]. In both Luros and Paris, the argument was made that the state had no legitimate interest in regulating the exhibition and distribution of obscene matter to consenting adults. Defendants in each case urged that Stanley v. Georgia [52](1969) 394 U.S. 557 [22 L.Ed.2d 542, 89 S.Ct. 1243], was controlling on this point. Stanley, however, held only that private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime. In Luros, we carefully noted the important distinction, recognized by the federal Supreme Court in Stanley, between commercial distribution of obscenity and the private possession thereof. We concluded that “. . . in the context of public distribution of obscenity, the balance of interests upholds the constitutionality of state regulation, even though that regulation imposes some burdens upon the exercise of constitutional rights. [¶] . . . States retain broad power to regulate obscenity and regulation of the public distribution of obscenity falls well within the broad scope of that power.” (4 Cal.3d at pp. 92-93.) We reaffirm the foregoing conclusion reached by us in Luros:
Similarly, Paris (decided after Harmer was filed) rejected the extension of Stanley to situations involving consenting adults. The high court specifically addressed the Harmer limitation on the scope of the public interest, and “categorically disapprove^] the theory, . . . that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity from state regulation simply because they are exhibited for consenting adults only.” (413 U.S. at p. 57 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 456]; see also pp. 57-69 [37 L.Ed.2d pp. 456-464].) The court noted that “[t]he States have a long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation, as long as these regulations do not run afoul of specific constitutional prohibitions. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 57 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 457].) These “legitimate interests” include “the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself. The Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography indicates that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.” (Fn. omitted; id., at p. 58 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 457], italics added.) Further, “[although there is no conclusive proof , of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature . . . could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist.” (Id., at pp. 60-61 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 459].)
Following its rejection of the argument that Stanley forbids state regulation of the exhibition or distribution of obscene matter, the Paris court very significantly observed: “Commercial exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of obscene conduct on commercial premises open to the adult public falls within a State’s broad power to [53]regulate commerce and protect the public environment. The issue in this context goes beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as ‘wrong’ or ‘sinful.’ The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s words, the States’ ‘right ... to maintain a decent society.’ [Citation.]” (Italics added; Paris at pp. 68-69 [37 L.Ed.2d at pp. 463-464].) Both Luros and Paris explain and confirm that the interests of those who voluntarily view and purchase obscene materials are not necessarily coextensive with the interests of the community at large.
Even more recently the United States Supreme Court has noted that a state’s public nuisance action seeking to close a theater exhibiting obscene films constituted an effort “to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards which are embodied in its criminal laws.” (Fn. omitted; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. (1975) 420 U.S. 592, 605 [43 L.Ed.2d 482, 492, 95 S.Ct. 1200].)
Thus, the Paris court has clearly held that states may constitutionally determine that public exhibition of obscene material has a tendency to injure the community or to jeopardize the maintenance of a decent society. In Luros we confirmed the validity of state regulation of the commercial distribution of obscene materials. The legislative definition of a public nuisance includes “[a]nything which is . . . indecent, or offensive to the senses, ... so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by a ... community or neighborhood, or... any considerable number of persons . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 370.) California’s public nuisance definition, including as it does indecency, comports fully with the state’s power to regulate as recently declared both by the federal Supreme Court and by ourselves and fortifies our conclusion that public nuisance laws may properly be employed to regulate the exhibition of obscene material to “consenting adults.”
Given the legitimate state interests in controlling the exhibition of obscenity, carefully outlined in Paris, it is not surprising that a wide variety of cases, both before and after Paris, have confirmed that such exhibitions constitute nuisances which properly may be abated by the courts. (Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask (N.D.Ohio 1970) 326 F.Supp. 574, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 902 [37 L.Ed.2d 1013,
[5493] S.Ct. 3026]; Bloss v. Paris Township (1968) 380 Mich. 466 [157 N.W.2d 260, 261]; Cactus Corporation v. State ex rel. Murphy (1971) 14 Ariz.App. 38 [480 P.2d 375]; Evans Theatre Corporation v. Slaton (1971) 227 Ga. 377 [180 S.E.2d 712], cert, den., 404 U.S. 950 [30 L.Ed.2d 267, 92 S.Ct. 281]; New Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State (1967) 219 Tenn. 652 [412 S.W.2d 890, 893-895]; Sanders v. State (1974) 231 Ga. 608 [203 S.E.2d 153, 156-157]; State ex rel. Ewing v. “Without A Stitch” (1974) 37 Ohio St.2d 95 [66 Ohio Ops.2d 223, 307 N.E.2d 911], app. dism., 421 U.S. 923 [44 L.Ed.2d 82, 95 S.Ct. 1649]; State ex rel. Keating v. Vixen (1971) 27 Ohio St.2d 278 [56 Ohio Ops.2d 165, 272 N.E.2d 137], vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 905 [37 L.Ed.2d 1016, 93 S.Ct. 3033], opn. on remand, 35 Ohio St.2d 215 [64 Ohio Ops.2d 366, 301 N.E.2d 880]; State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin (Fla.App. 1972) 258 So.2d 30, 31-32; State v. Morley (1957) 63 N.M. 267 [317 P.2d 317, 318-319]; see generally, Note (1975) 10 U.S.F. L.Rev. 115).
Each of the above cases either expressly or implicitly recognizes that the exhibition of obscene magazines or films constitutes a public nuisance properly subject to abatement. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court in Evans upheld application of a general public nuisance statute to an allegedly obscene film, “I Am Curious (Yellow).” The court explained that “[i]f any semblance of civilization is retained in our country, the States must have standards of conduct permissible in public. There is little difference in the effect on the public between lewd conduct in public areas and lewd conduct explicitly performed on a motion picture screen for the viewing of the public. . . . The exhibition of an obscene motion picture is a crime involving the welfare of the public at large, since it is contrary to the standards of decency and propriety of the community as a whole. The welfare of the whole community is served by restraining the showing of such an obscene film.” (180 S.E.2d at pp. 715-716.)
Evans was cited and discussed with approval in Paris, supra, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 [37 L.Ed.2d 446, 454-456], wherein the court expressly approved use of public nuisance actions to enjoin the exhibition of obscene materials. Since this portion of Paris is critical to our analysis, we quote it in its entirety:
“Georgia case law permits a civil injunction of the exhibition of obscene materials. [Citations, including Evans, supra.] While this procedure is civil in nature, and does not directly involve the state criminal statute proscribing exhibition of obscene material, the Georgia case law [55]permitting civil injunction does adopt the definition of ‘obscene materials’ used by the criminal statute. Today, in Miller v. California, supra, we have sought to clarify the constitutional definition of obscene material subject to regulations by the States, and we vacate and remand this case for reconsideration in light of Miller.
“This is not to be read as disapproval of the Georgia civil procedure employed in this case, assuming the use of a constitutionally acceptable standard for determining what is unprotected by the First Amendment. On the contrary, such a procedure provides an exhibitor or purveyor of materials the best possible notice, prior to any criminal indictments, as to whether the materials are unprotected by the First Amendment and subject to state regulation. [Citation.] Here, Georgia imposed no restraint on the exhibition of the films involved in this case until after a full adversary proceeding and a final judicial determination by the Georgia Supreme Court that the materials were constitutionally unprotected. Thus the standards of [prior United States Supreme Court decisions] were met.” (Italics added; Paris at pp. 54-55 [37 L.Ed.2d at pp. 454-456].)
Similarly, as we explain hereinafter, the California public nuisance statutes must be enforced in such a way as to operate in a constitutional fashion. So applied, as the foregoing cases make clear, there is no overriding principle of law which precludes thé states from regulating the exhibition of obscene matter by application of their public nuisance statutes. To this extent, Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.3d 941, is disapproved.
We do not suggest, of course, that law enforcement officers in each city and county in this state have a mandatory duty always and everywhere to abate the exhibition of obscene matter within their borders. The particular nature of the exhibition, and its effect upon the community, may vary considerably in time and place. Law enforcement officers accordingly are vested with wide discretion to decide whether or not to initiate the kind of formal abatement proceedings such as those instituted in the matters before us. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 731.) Once a community through its public officials has determined that a particular display of obscene materials amounts to a public nuisance which is injurious to the safety and morals of that community, no valid reason exists why, adequate constitutional procedural safeguards being met, the remedy of civil abatement proceedings must be denied such community. The availability of the public nuisance procedure may prove useful for those local entities which, determining that they are confronted with [56]commercial exploitation of obscene materials resulting in the conditions contemplated in section 370, elect to use it.
We consider and will reject several constitutional objections raised by defendants.
Defendants first suggest that the statutory language “indecent, or offensive to the senses” (Pen. Code, § 370) is impermissibly vague, requiring them to guess as to its meaning, and thus is violative of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. Several cases involving similar language have avoided the constitutional problem by construing such language as synonymous with the word “obscene,” as defined in the applicable statutes and case law. (See In re Giannini (1968) 69 Cal.2d 563, 571, fn. 4 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535] [“lewd or dissolute conduct”]; Silva v. Municipal Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 733, 736-737 [115 Cal.Rptr. 479] [same]; Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, supra, 326 F.Supp. 574, 578 [“lewd, indecent, lascivious or obscene”]; Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth (Tex.Civ.App. 1962) 354 S.W.2d 597, 600 [“indecent”]; State ex rel. Ewing v. “Without A Stitch,” supra, 307 N.E.2d 911, 914-915 [“obscene” construed in light of recent United States Supreme Court opinions].)
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court recently emphasized within the foregoing context that courts have an obligation to construe statutes in such a way as to avoid serious constitutional doubts. “If and when such a ‘serious doubt’ is raised as to the vagueness of the words ‘obscene,’ ‘lewd,’ ‘lascivious,’ ‘filthy,’ ‘indecent, ’ or ‘immoral’ as used to describe regulated material [in federal statutes], we are prepared to construe such terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific ‘hard core’ sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California . . . .” (Italics added; United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film (1973) 413 U.S. 123, 130, fn. 7 [37 L.Ed.2d 500, 507, 93 S.Ct. 2665]; accord, Hamling v. United States (1974) 418 U.S. 87, 114 [41 L.Ed.2d 590, 618-619, 94 S.Ct. 2887].) Indeed, in Bloom v. Municipal Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 81 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229], we have construed our own obscenity statute (Pen. Code, § 311, subd. (a) [“obscene matter”]) as referring to the patently offensive matter set forth in Miller, supra, and have rejected the contention that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. (Accord, People v. Enskat (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 900 [109 Cal.Rptr. 433].) We find no impediment to use of the remedy on grounds of statutoiy vagueness.
[57]Defendants next assert that use of the public nuisance statutes to enjoin or otherwise abate the exhibition of films or magazines violates the constitutional principle against prior restraint of presumptively protected materials. (See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad (1975) 420 U.S. 546, 558 [43 L.Ed.2d 448, 459, 95 S.Ct. 1239]; United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs (1971) 402 U.S. 363, 367 [28 L.Ed.2d 822, 828, 91 S.Ct. 1400]; Freedman v. Maryland (1965) 380 U.S. 51, 58 [13 L.Ed.2d 649, 654, 85 S.Ct. 734]; Kingslley Books, Inc. v. Brown (1957) 354 U.S. 436 [1 L.Ed.2d 1469, 77 S.Ct. 1325].) We note preliminarily that, as the foregoing cases make clear, prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se; a prior restraint may avoid constitutional infirmity if it occurs “ ‘under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.’ ” (Southeastern Promotions, Ltd, supra, at p. 559 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 460].) Among other safeguards, “a prompt final judicial determination must be assured.” (Id., at p. 560 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 460].)
In order properly to evaluate defendants’ prior restraint contention, we first review the possible forms of relief available to plaintiffs in an ordinary public nuisance action. The public nuisance statutes, unlike the Red Light Abatement Law, do not provide for such specific forms of relief as temporary and perpetual injunction (Pen. Code, §§ 11226-11227), removal and sale of fixtures, and closure of the premises for one year (Pen. Code, § 11230). Instead, the district attorney or city attorney is, in general terms, empowered to bring a civil action to “abate” the public nuisance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 731.) Further, “ ‘An abatement of a nuisance is accomplished in a court of equity by means of an injunction proper and suitable to the facts of each case. . . .’” (Italics added; Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co. (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 382, 390 [233 P.2d 914]; see generally McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 24.73.)
Thus, in the matters before us if the trial court finds the subject matter obscene under prevailing law an injunctive order may be fashioned that is “proper and suitable” in each case. It is entirely permissible from a constitutional standpoint to enjoin further exhibition of specific magazines or films which have been finally adjudged to be obscene following a full adversary hearing. (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 [37 L.Ed.2d 446, 454-456] [approving Georgia abatement procedure]; Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, supra, 326 F.Supp. 574, 579; New Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State, supra, 412 S.W.2d 890, 893-895; State ex rel. Ewing v. “Without A Stitch,”supra, 307 N.E.2d 911, 914; State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, supra, 258 So.2d 30, 32; State ex rel. Keating v. Vixen, supra, 272 N.E.2d 137; see Commonwealth v. Guild [58]Theatre, Inc. (1968) 432 Pa. 378 [248 A.2d 45]; Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia (3d Cir. 1969) 418 F.2d 82, 90-91; Sanders v. State, supra, 203 S.E.2d 153, 156-157.)
In the cases at bench, in addition to relief under the Red Light Abatement Act (Pen. Code, § 11225 et seq.),1 plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining defendants “from conducting and maintaining said premises hereinabove described . . . for the purposes of lewdness and from permitting such acts to take place therein and thereon . . . [and further pray that they] be perpetually enjoined from operating and conducting said premises as a public nuisance.” Both in their briefs and at oral argument plaintiffs have made abundantly clear that, as the prayers of their complaints state, the relief they seek is the abatement and closing down of movie theaters and bookstores exhibiting and selling films and magazines determined to be obscene. Although we have concluded upon well recognized principles of pleading that plaintiffs’ complaints state actionable causes for the enjoining of the exhibition and sale of specific obscene materials, we are satisfied that to grant the relief sought by plaintiffs (i.e., closing down the premises in question) would result in a full and pervasive prior restraint upon the freedom of speech and of the press in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 711-715, 720 [75 L.Ed. 1357, 1365-1367, 1369, 51 S.Ct. 625]; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan (1963) 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 [9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593-594, 83 S.Ct. 631]; Freedman v. Maryland, supra, 380 U.S. 51, 57 [13 L.Ed.2d 649, 653-654]; Carroll v. Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, 180-181 [21 L.Ed.2d 325, 330-331, 89 S.Ct. 347]; see and compare Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, 354 U.S. 436; see also Perrine v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 656, 664-665 [97 Cal.Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648]; Flack v. Municipal Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 981, 985-990, passim [59 Cal.Rptr. 872, 429 P.2d 192].) The courts of a number of our sister states have similarly held that such prior restraints as here sought by plaintiffs are constitutionally impermissible. (See General Corporation v. State ex rel. Sweeton (Ala. 1975) 320 So.2d 668, 675 (plurality opn.); Gulf States Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson (La. 1973) 287 So.2d 480, 489; Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub (Fla. 1971) 250 So.2d 883, 886-887; New Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State, supra, 412 S.W.2d 890, 893-895; Sanders v. State, supra, 203 S.E.2d 153, 156-157; State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, supra, 258 So.2d 30, 32; State ex rel. Ewing v. “Without A Stitch,”supra, 307 N.E.2d 911, 917-918; but see [59]People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 556, 562-563 [117 Cal.Rptr. 24]; Bloss v. Paris Township, supra, 157 N.W.2d 260; Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, supra, 326 F.Supp. 574, 578-580; United Theaters of Fla., Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein (Fla.App. 1972) 259 So.2d 210, 212-213, vacated and remanded 419 U.S. 1028 [42 L.Ed.2d 304, 95 S.Ct. 510].)
Thus, in Sanders, the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out that “One obscene book on the premises of a book store does not make an entire store obscene. The injunction closing this store and padlocking it as a public nuisance necessarily halted the future sale and distribution of other printed material which may not be obscene, thereby precluding the application of the above procedural safeguards [prior notice and a prompt judicial hearing] and creating an unconstitutional restraint upon appellant. This broad result cannot be reconciled with free expression under our Constitutions.” (P. 157.)
We are aware of no reported cases authorizing the closing of a bookstore or theater, even after it has been repeatedly determined judicially in a full adversary hearing that all or substantially all of the magazines or films exhibited or sold therein are obscene. Indeed plaintiffs have directed our attention to no such precedents, have presented nothing to countermand or distinguish the authorities referred to above, and at oral argument stated they could find no authority justifying the closing of bookstores in such circumstances. While we have concluded that a court of equity, having determined particular magazines or films to be obscene, after a full adversary hearing, may enjoin the exhibition or sale thereof by those responsible, we emphasize that the closing of such bookstores or theaters, either temporarily or permanently, or the enjoining of the exhibition or sale on said premises of magazines or films not specifically so determined to be obscene, constitutes an impermissible prior restraint in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
We therefore hold that abatement in the present action must be directed to particular books or films which have been adjudged obscene following a fair and full adversary hearing, rather than against the premises in which the material is sold, exhibited or displayed.
Defendants finally maintain that since the public nuisance statutes are silent with respect to prior adversary hearings, this court should not undertake to “rewrite” those statutes to require such hearings. [60]Such a contention lacks merit. We are obliged to construe and interpret legislation in a manner which will uphold its validity. (Braxton v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 138, 145 [109 Cal.Rptr. 897, 514 P.2d 697]; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 941-942 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].) Thus, the courts have held that provision for a prior adversary hearing may be implied by law in otherwise silent statutory provisions. (State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, supra, 258 So.2d 30, 31-32; see United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, 402 U.S. 363, 367-373 [28 L.Ed.2d 822, 828-832].) As hereinabove expressed, abatement of a nuisance is accomplished by means of a “proper and suitable” injunction. In the context of assertedly obscene magazines and films, a “proper” injunction ordinarily is one that is issued after the requisite adversary hearing has taken place.
We emphasize that the proceedings now before us remain at the pleading stage. Having determined that plaintiffs’ complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action based upon a general nuisance theory, we consider it inappropriate to describe in detail the precise dimensions of the injunctive and other relief which might be suitable in this and the related cases. It is enough that the parties and the trial court recognize that substantial constitutional issues are presented in this litigation, and that care must be exercised to assure that defendants’ constitutional rights are not infringed. More than this is not required.
2. Red Light Abatement Law
As an alternative theory of relief, plaintiffs allege that defendants’ exhibition of obscene magazines and films constitutes a nuisance subject to abatement under the provisions of the Red Light Abatement Law (Pen. Code, § 11225 et seq.). We have previously noted that these provisions prescribe certain specific forms of relief not available under the general nuisance statutes, including temporary injunctions, removal and sale of fixtures, and closure of the premises for one year. (Pen. Code, §§ 11227, 11230.)
The Red Light Abatement Law defines as a nuisance “[e]very building or place used for the purpose of illegal gambling as defined by state law or local ordinance, lewdness, assignation, or prostitution . . . .” (Italics added.) Defendants maintain that the term “lewdness” does not include the exhibition of obscene magazines or films in bookstores or theaters. We agree.
[61]The law was passed in 1913 and, as its name indicates, its primary purpose was to regulate “... houses of ill fame,... and other like places, where acts of lewdness and prostitution are habitually practiced and carried on as a business.” (People v. Barbiere (1917) 33 Cal.App. 770, 775 [166 P. 812].) It has been held that the terms “lewdness, assignation, or prostitution” were “obviously” intended to refer to “illicit sexual acts or conduct amounting to or involving lewdness.” (People v. Arcega (1920) 49 Cal.App. 239, 242 [193 P. 264].) The term “lewdness” is not synonymous with “prostitution” and has a broader significance, including “all other immoral or degenerate conduct or conversation between persons of opposite sexes,...” including the solicitation of sexual acts to be performed elsewhere. (People v. Bayside Land Co. (1920) 48 Cal.App. 257, 260 [191 P. 994].)
The consensus of more recent cases is that the term “lewdness” is broad enough to include live lewd entertainment, such as stage shows or other exhibitions featuring obscene performances. (People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 46, 50 [103 Cal.Rptr. 414], subsequent opn., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 556, 559; Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.3d 941, 944; Maita v. Whitmore (N.D.Cal. 1973) 365 F.Supp. 1331.) Yet no California case has yet held that the Red Light Abatement Law was intended to apply to the exhibition of obscene magazines or films. As stated in Harmer: “If the Legislature had desired or intended by section 11225 of the Penal Code to regulate the showing of pornographic films, pictures or drawings, such subject matter could have been included in section 11225 when it was recently amended in 1969, as it did when it chose to enumerate ‘illegal gambling as defined by state law or local ordinance’ in that section of the Penal Code.” (23 Cal.App.3d at p. 944.) On the other hand, it has been forcefully contended that “it borders upon the absurd to apply the law to live stage shows and exhibitions that are lewd and to deny its application to motion pictures that are patently lewd and obscene.” (Id., at p. 952 [dis. opn.]; see also People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 50.)
The courts of other states have generally agreed that “red light” laws do not apply to the exhibition of obscene books or films. (People v. Goldman (1972) 7 Ill.App.3d 253 [287 N.E.2d 177]; Gulf States Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson, supra, 287 So.2d 480; Southland Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Tucker (1973) 254 Ark. 192 [492 S.W.2d 421]; State v. Morley, supra, 317 P.2d 317, 318-320; State ex rel. Cabalan v. Diversified Theat. (1975) 59 Mich.App. 223 [229 N.W.2d 389].)
[62]Although the question is not free from doubt, in view of the history of the Red Light Abatement Law and the uniform interpretation given it by the courts of this state, we conclude that the act’s provisions were not intended to apply, and do not apply, to the exhibition of obscene magazines or films.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Wright, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
As we explain infra, this enactment is inapplicable to any of the cases before us.