In Re Boyle

California Supreme Court Apr 10, 1974 No. Docket Nos. Crim. 17534, 17602Published

Before: Mosk

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Holding. Petitioners are entitled to have bail fixed because the crimes charged against them do not qualify as 'capital offenses' under the current statutory framework, as the information lacks the necessary allegations of special circumstances required for the death penalty.

Issues

Whether the crimes charged against petitioners constitute 'capital offenses' under the current California Penal Code for the purpose of denying bail.
Whether petitioners are entitled to an order fixing bail as a matter of right.

Disposition. Writ issued

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“We conclude that petitioners are not charged with a crime which would have been a “capital offense” under the new statute.”

“Petitioners are therefore entitled “as a matter of right” (Pen. Code, § 1271) to an order fixing bail.”

Opinion

MOSK, J.

In these consolidated cases petitioners Boyle and Glasscock seek writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of fixing bail. (Pen. Code, § 1490.) They are jointly charged, with other defendants, in a multiple-count

[167]

information filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Insofar as relevant to this proceeding, the information accuses petitioners of murder (count VI) and conspiracy to commit murder and other felonies (count V).

Article I, section 6, of the California Constitution declares that “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.” In the case at bar the trial court denied petitioners’ motions for bail on the ground that as to the crimes charged in counts V and VI the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption thereof great.

The determinative question, however, is whether these crimes are “capital offenses” within the meaning of article I, section 6. The constitutional provision does not itself define the term; it simply withholds in such cases a constitutional right to bail, and impliedly grants to the Legislature the power to implement that exception. Pursuant to that grant, the Legislature (1) enacted a procedural statute expressly forbidding bail in capital cases in which the proof is evident or the presumption great (Pen. Code, § 1270), and (2) delineated the class of such cases by substantive provisions imposing the death penalty for specified offenses.

Among those offenses, prior to February 18, 1972, were first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190) and conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, 190). On the cited date we decided

People

Anderson, 6

Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], in which we held that infliction of the death penalty violates the cruel or unusual punishments clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 6). In order to subserve the purpose of the constitutional and statutory provisions on bail, however, we further held in footnote 45 of our decision

In Re Boyle

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MOSK, J.

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