Lascher v. State of California

McCOMB, J.

-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the superior court granting defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.

Facts: Plaintiff, an attorney at law, was appointed by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, to represent two defendants in the ease of People v. Darnold (219 Cal.App.2d 561 [33 Cal.Rptr. 369]). He has performed the duties for which he was appointed.

August 26, 1963, the District Court of Appeal flied its opinion affirming judgments of conviction. October 23, 1963, this court denied a petition for hearing. February 17, 1964, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari (Darnold v. California, 376 U.S. 927 [84 S.Ct. 694, 11 L.Ed.2d 623]).

Thereafter, plaintiff made application to the District Court of Appeal for "reasonable compensation." February 25, 1964, the District Court of Appeal ordered "that such reasonable compensation [under the provisions of Penal Code section 1241] is hereby fixed in the sum of $250.00." February 28. 1964, plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing and/or reconsideration of the order awarding compensation, which petition was denied.

Plaintiff then petitioned this court for a hearing, seeking a determination by us that the District Court of Appeal abused its discretion in making the award. April 22, 1964, the petition was denied.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed the present suit against the State of California, seeking compensation for the services rendered by him, as set forth above. Plaintiff alleges that he worked 233.8 hours on the case, and made expenditures of $338, in

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proceedings before the District Court of Appeal and this court.

Prior to 1941, no provision was made in this state for the payment of court-appointed attorneys. Such counsel had theretofore served without pecuniary compensation, thus honoring the long recognized concept of the profession that “It is the duty of an attorney: . . . Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (h).)

By a 1941 statute, the Legislature formulated a somewhat different policy, contemplating that court-appointed attorneys should no longer be required to bear the entire financial burden of accepting appointment as defense counsel in the trial courts.