City of Los Angeles v. Harper

SHINN, J.,

pro

tem.

In this action to condemn a narrow strip of land from the edge of certain lots, A. Brownstein Building Corporation, as owner, was allowed the value of the land taken but was denied severance damage; wherefore it appeals from the judgment.

The lots in question are located in an industrial district of Los Angeles. Violet Alley, 15 feet wide, extends along the westerly side of the lots, and along the center of this alley extends a "drill track ’ ’ of the Southern Pacific Bailroad. Under general order of the railroad commission the center line of standard gauge railroad tracks must be 8% feet from the sides or nearest projection of buildings. Because some buildings along the alley were built flush with the property line it became necessary to widen the alley to 17 feet and this proceeding was instituted to take 2 feet from the west side of appellant’s property. The property is improved with a

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two-story concrete building, set back 14 feet from the alley, which intervening space now is reduced to 12 feet by reason of these proceedings. Another order of the railroad commission requires minimum clearance of 13 feet between the center lines of parallel tracks of standard gauge railroads. Appellant’s building is so located that appellant could lawfully build and maintain a spur track upon the unoccupied 14 feet of its lots adjoining the alley. Now that the Southern Pacific track is located in the middle of the alley and one foot nearer to appellant’s building than before, appellant cannot build or maintain a spur track upon its property parallel to the track in the alley, because there would not be sufficient room to give the required clearance between the center of such private spur track and appellant’s building on the one side, and the center of the railroad’s spur track in the alley on the other, although this could be done by setting back the west wall of appellant’s building at a cost of $24,705.

The first point advanced by appellant is that the court erred in striking out an agreed statement of facts which had been signed by appellant’s counsel, and by a deputy city attorney on behalf of respondent, under the following circumstances : appraisers for the parties had examined the property ands formed opinions as to values and damages; several days before the trial the case was reassigned for trial from the deputy city attorney who had it in charge to another deputy. On the morning of the trial the deputy who had been relieved from further service in the case, without consulting the deputy to whom the case had been assigned or the city attorney, signed the stipulation of facts. Upon the trial, the deputy city attorney in charge moved the court to strike out the statement upon the grounds that it had been signed without authority and through inadvertence. This motion was granted after the court took evidence on the motion. We see no error in the ruling. By the terms of the stipulation' it was agreed that appellant’s land would suffer severance damage of $25,000, this supposed damage consisting principally of the cost of setting back the west wall of appellant’s building to make room for a spur track, in case appellant should ever desire to build one. The testimony of the deputy who had signed the stipulation sufficiently shows that he had not intended to stipulate to the fact that damage would be sustained in any amount, but only as to the amount that would