Douglas v. Douglas

California Court of Appeal Mar 21, 1951 No. Civ. 18247Published

Before: Moore

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Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches because she failed to bring the suit within three years of discovering the alleged fraudulent transfers and the repudiation of the trusts.

Issues

Whether an action to terminate a constructive trust is barred by the three-year statute of limitations when brought more than three years after the discovery of the fraud.
Whether an action to enforce an express oral trust is barred by laches when the beneficiary has knowledge of the repudiation of the trust for a significant period before filing suit.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If the complaint be considered as an action to terminate a constructive trust the general demurrer was properly sustained on the ground that the action was brought more than three years after the fraudulent transfer”

“The statute commences to run when the cause of action accrues.”

“The policy of the law is to prevent stale claims from springing up after the lapse of long periods of time”

MOORE, P. J.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment that she take nothing against defendants entered after the general and special demurrers against her complaint had been sustained without leave to amend.

The allegations of the complaint in substance are: appellant is wife of defendant Edwin Samuel Douglas. Edwin S. Douglas, Jr., and Grace Lorraine Kunkle are his children by a former marriage. April 28, 1944, Edwin, Sr., sued appellant for divorce. She filed a cross-complaint and on a hearing of an order to show cause therein, the court ordered Edwin, Sr., to pay his wife $250 per month as alimony commencing November 15, 1944, which order has become final. After the 15th of January, 1946, no payment has been made. About September, 1944, Douglas, Sr., transferred to Edwin, Jr., certain real and personal property in Los Angeles County and specified realty in San Bernardino County and in Arizona for the purpose of fraudulently depriving Mrs. Douglas of her interest in such properties and to prevent her from collecting the alimony awarded and to be awarded to her.

[31]

At the time of such transfers Edwin, Jr., agreed to hold the properties for the benefit of Douglas, Sr., and accepted them for the purpose of defrauding Mrs. Douglas. Defendants claim that none of such properties was ever so held in trust. Both father and son claim that they belong to Edwin, Jr., but such claim is untrue. Douglas, Sr., now resides in New York. There is no other property of Douglas, Sr., than those described. On January 11, 1950, on the petition of defendants other than Douglas, Sr., this court issued its writ prohibiting the superior court from further proceeding with the divorce action on the ground that more than five years had elapsed from the time of filing to the bringing of such action to trial and the judgment is final. As a result of the writ of prohibition, the superior court cannot issue either a writ of execution on the order for alimony or issue an order for supplemental proceedings. The trust alleged has never been repudiated. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

In her four additional counts plaintiff alleges a constructive trust of realty in Oregon and Washington and attempts to declare express oral trusts with respect to each of the same items of real property and certain movables in California; she combines (count 3) allegations of constructive trusts with respect to three items of personal property with allegations of express oral trusts with respect to each of the same items of personalty. She combines (count 4) allegations of a constructive trust in her favor with respect to a parcel of realty in Riverside County with allegations purporting to establish an express oral trust with reference thereto. In her fifth count she combines all the allegations of the first four causes with allegations of moneys due. Douglas, Sr., not having been served with process, his codefendants demurred specially and generally to all counts.

Douglas v. Douglas

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MOORE, P. J.

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